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Abstract
This Report is divided into five parts, which track the main issues that the mission examined.
Part I examines the arbitrary arrest and detention practices that are widespread in Mexico. Part
II explores the conditions and standards that lead to the taking of coerced confessions, as well
as the ready use of such confessions at trial. In Part III, this Report turns to issues relating to
legal representation in Mexico, especially the denial of access to counsel at critical points of the
criminal process. The intimidation of defense attorneys, persons of confidence, and human rights
advocates furnishes the subject of Part IV. Finally, Part V analyzes the role and performance of
the Mexican judiciary, which represents a failed opportunity to redress many of the problems that
the Report elsewhere recounts. Aside from detailing the mission’s evidence, each section of the
report discusses applicable international and domestic standards, and concludes with findings and
recommendations.
SPECIAL REPORT
PRESUMED GUILTY?: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN MEXICO
Report of the Joseph R Crowley Program in
International Human Rights/Centro de Derechos
Humanos Miguel Agustin Pro Judrez ("PRODH"):
Joint 2000 Mission ,in Mexico*
INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 1990, Manuel Manrfquez San Agustfn ("Manuel
Manrfquez"), a mariachi musician, was performing in a town
square in Mexico City. Several men approached him, seeking
the musical services of the mariachi band. Once the members of
the band boarded the truck in which they traveled together, they
were blindfolded and taken to the offices of the Public Ministry.
The men who had approached them were agents of the Mexico
City judicial police. At the Public Ministry, members of the judi-
cial police detained Manuel Manrfquez without an arrest war-
* The Joseph R. Crowley Program ("Program" or "Crowley Program") at Fordham
University School of Law and The Miguel Agustin Pro Judrez Human Rights Center
("PRODH") wish to thank everyone who met with our delegation and who provided
advice and assistance throughout the project. The members of the Crowley Program as
well as the other U.S. based participants are especially indebted to our colleagues at the
PRODH, and many others without whom we could not have undertaken this mission.
In particular, we would like to thank Edgar Cortez, Digna Ochoa, Mario Patron
Sanchez, Michel Maza, and Laurie Freeman from the PRODH, attorneys Pilar Noriega,
Bdrbara Zamora, and Israel Ochoa, professors Miguel Sarre and Santiago Corcuera,
and law student and legal representative Ana Lorena Delgadillo. Their invaluable
assistance, their courageous dedication to justice, and their tireless efforts to promote
the rule of law will remain a constant source of inspiration to all of us who participated
in the mission. In addition, the Crowley Program and the PRODH would like to record
our debt to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and in particular to Denise
Gilman, for invaluable support and advice before, during, and after the mission. The
Crowley Program and the PRODH would also like to thank Alejandra Ndifiez, who, at
the time, was a law student at the Autonomous Technical Institute of Mexico and Anil
VAzquez, a student at Fordham Law School, for their assistance with translation.
Finally, the Co-Directors of the Crowley Program and the PRODH wish to single out the
work of Peggy Healy, without whose extraordinary energy and dedication no mission
would have been possible.
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rant1 and tortured him in order to force him to confess to a
recent murder.2 They beat him on several parts of his body,
burned his testicles, and put gas and chili peppers up his nose.3
Seven days later, when Manuel Manrfquez was brought
before a judge, he revoked his confession, stating that he had
been tortured and, as a result, signed a false confession. The
coerced confession was the only piece of evidence linking him to
the murder.4 Nevertheless, Manuel Manrfquez was convicted of
homicide and sentenced to twenty-seven years in prison.5 An ap-
pellate court affirmed that decision6 and subsequent motions to
overturn his conviction were rejected.'
After serving nine years, Manuel Manriquez was finally
1. See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 2/99 Manuel Manrfquez, para. 40(a) (1999),
available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/98eng/merits/Mexico%2011509.htm
[hereinafter IACHR Report on Manuel Manrquez].
2. The confession states that a fight had ensued among several of Manuel Manrf-
quez's friends and two brothers, when Manuel Manrfquez arrived at the scene. One of
the two brothers was already dead when he arrived and Manuel Manrfquez killed the
other one. The confession further states that Manuel Manriquez hired a driver with a
pick-up truck to drive him and his accomplices to an area where they could dispose of
the bodies, which they had placed in cardboard boxes. Manuel Manrfquez then helped
to load the bodies into the truck and to dump them in a remote area.
3. See IACHR Report on Manuel Manriquez, supra note 1, para. 3. The act of torture
was confirmed after a doctor examined Manuel Manriquez in prison shortly after his
detention. See Direcci6n General de Servicio de Salud de la Ciudad de Mexico [Medi-
cal Certificate issued by the General Division of Health Services for Mexico City],June
8, 1990, cited in id. para. 49. The Mexican National Human Rights Commission
("CNDH") also found that Manuel Manrfquez had been tortured. See Recommenda-
tion 35/94, CNDH GACETA, Mar. 17, 1994 (finding that "there is sufficient evidence to
state that Manuel Manrfquez, during the time he was detained, was subjected to torture
by those who apprehended him"); see also Decision of the 12th District Court in Crimi-
nal Matters in Case 241/95, Nov. 21, 1996 (criminally convicting one of the agents of
the judicial police who tortured Manuel Manrfquez).
4. See IACHR Report on Manuel Manrquez, supra note 1, para. 66 (stating that "the
[Inter-American] Commission considers that in effect the confession of Manuel Manrf-
quez, obtained under torture, was the only part of the evidence that led the judges to
determine that he was the direct perpetrator of the homicide of which he was ac-
cused").
5. Decision of the 36th Criminal Judge, June 9, 1990.
6. See Decision of the 11th Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice for
Mexico City, Jan. 29, 1992 (relying on Manuel Manrfquez's confession to find that the
trial court had sufficient evidence for a conviction).
7. See IACHR Report on Manuel ManrYquez, supra note 1, para. 4 (noting that motions
to overturn his conviction were rejected by the First Collegial Court on Criminal Mat-
ters for Mexico City on October 15, 1992; the Ninth Chamber of the Superior Court of
Justice for Mexico City on August 31, 1994; and the First District Court for Criminal
Matters on January 27, 1995).
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granted a judicial remedy known as recognition of innocence'
and released, which was prompted by the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights' ("Inter-American Commission's")
findings that agents of the judicial police tortured him.9 One of
the judges on the appellate panel that granted Manuel Manrf-
quez's release was, coincidentally, the same judge who had de-
nied him an earlier appeal. When asked about his change of
heart, the judge responded that although he personally still be-
lieved Manuel Manrfquez was guilty, he reversed his decision for
two reasons: an international human rights body had intervened
in the case and, after nine years in prison, the judge believed
that Manuel Manrfquez had served enough time for his crime.'
The Manuel Manrfquez case demonstrates that the Mexican
criminal justice system is riddled with serious failings, but is sus-
ceptible to reform. The failings include the arbitrary arrest and
detention of individuals by the judicial police, the use of torture
to obtain false confessions, and the evidentiary weight given to
these confessions by judges, despite detainees' statements that
they were obtained through coercion. The judge we inter-
viewed, who was one of the judges on the panel that granted
Manuel Manrfquez's release, for example, was not convinced of
his innocence or of the compelling evidence of the torture he
suffered. The judge also failed to recognize the need not to base
convictions on confessions obtained through torture. Yet the
case also demonstrates that justice can be achieved in the Mexi-
can criminal justice system. Although Manuel Manriquez served
nine years in prison for a crime that he did not commit, he was
eventually released through the recognition of innocence rem-
edy, impelled by the Inter-American Commission's findings of
torture. Indeed, at least according to some officials we inter-
viewed, subsequent reforms to the criminal justice system have
8. This remedy may only be sought in very limited circumstances, when new incon-
trovertible evidence is found that invalidates the evidence which served as the basis for
the conviction. See C.F.P.P. [Federal Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 49, 96 [herein-
after FCCP]; C.P.P.D.F. [Mexico City Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 49, 96 [herein-
after MCCCPI; C.P.D.F. [Federal Criminal Code], art. 560; C.P.D.F. [Mexico City Crimi-
nal Code], art. 614.
9. IACHR Report on Manuel Manrdquez, supra note 1, para. 40 (finding that "it has
been shown irrefutably that Manuel Manrfquez was tortured by agents of the Mexican
State").
10. See Interview with Name Withheld, Mexico City Supreme Court Judge, Supe-
rior Tribunal of Justice, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 25, 2000).
20011
804 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:801
helped prevent this kind of a case from recurring."
Abuse by police and prosecutorial agents can be remedied
by ajudicial system willing to act independently to ensure justice
and to undertake reform. Nonetheless, too few necessary re-
forms have been implemented and too few judges apply existing
reforms with sufficient independence. Nor do other officials,
such as prosecutors, show adequate concern for the protection
of fundamental freedoms. The Manuel Manrfquez case, in sum,
illustrates that Mexico has a long road to travel before its crimi-
nal justice system becomes rooted in human rights principles.
Until effective reforms are undertaken and take hold in Mexico,
international human rights law and intergovernmental human
rights bodies will be crucial in safeguarding fundamental free-
doms.
This Report contains the findings of a mission to Mexico
examining the Mexican criminal justice system by the Joseph R.
Crowley Program in International Human Rights at Fordham
Law School ("Program" or "Crowley Program") .12 The mission
was undertaken in partnership with the Centro de Derechos
Humanos Miguel Agustin Pro Judirez"3 ("PRODH"), a leading
11. See, e.g., Interview with Enrique Sinchez Sandoval, Jos6 Lepe Carrera, and
Javier Radl Anaya, Mexico City Supreme Court Judges, Superior Tribunal of Justice, in
Mexico City, Mex. (June 1, 2000).
12. The Crowley Programs promotes teaching, scholarship, and advocacy in inter-
national human rights law. Principal elements of the Program include an annual fact-
finding mission to an area of the world with significant human rights concerns; a stu-
dent outreach project involving students in course work, research, and human rights
internships, both domestically and abroad; and a speaker series, bringing many of the
world's foremost experts in the field onto campus, stimulating dialogue and promoting
scholarship. The Crowley Program approaches its work in these areas in light of the
School's commitment to public service, its widely recognized strength in the field of
international law, and its close proximity to the world's leading centers for human
rights advocacy. For more information, visit the Crowley Program website at http://
law.fordham.edu/crowley.htm.
13. PRODH was founded in 1988 by the religious order of the Jesuits in Mexico.
PRODH is a non-governmental organization that seeks to promote a culture of respect
for human rights and to defend persons or groups whose human rights have been vio-
lated. Based in Mexico City and with legal offices in the Mexican states of Chiapas,
Guerrero, and Oaxaca, PRODH works with local, national, and international organiza-
tions to consolidate human rights protection in Mexico, particularly for those who suf-
fer injustice, poverty, and marginalization. PRODH's seven basic areas of work are:
research and analysis, legal defense, education and training, investigation and docu-
mentation of abuse, international advocacy, psychological attention to victims of tor-
ture, and defense of persons with HIV/AIDS. For more information, visit the PRODH
website at http://www.sjsocial.org/PRODH.
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non-governmental organization ("NGO") based in Mexico City
that is known for its work in the defense of human rights in Mex-
ico. The mission was comprised of: Tracy Higgins and Martin
Flaherty, Fordham Law professors and Co-Directors of the Crow-
ley Program; Peggy Healy, Crowley Program Special Projects Di-
rector; Luke McGrath, 1999/2000 Crowley Fellow; Robert
Varenik, an expert in Latin American legal systems on the staff
of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights ("Lawyers Commit-
tee"); and Scott Greathead, a lawyer who has traveled widely in
Latin America for the Lawyers Committee Human Rights Watch,
and other organizations. The mission also consisted of six Ford-
ham Law students who had spent the prior year studying human
rights law and the Mexican criminal justice system: Susan
Chung, Matt McGough, Molly Murphy, Elizabeth Quinlan, Irum
Taqi, and Philip Yook. In addition, Lauris Wren, an attorney in
New York, and Shauna Morden, a student at the School of Inter-
national and Public Affairs at Columbia University, participated.
The delegation visited Mexico from May 28 to June 8, 2000,
during which it conducted extensive interviews of government
prosecutors and police officials, judges, defense lawyers, and
human rights advocates.14 The delegation carried out its work in
courts, offices, and prison facilities in and around Mexico City,
Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Guerrero. In each of these places, mem-
bers of the mission team were able to observe judicial proceed-
ings and to interview a number of individuals who have been
charged and convicted of serious crimes.
Based on applicable human rights standards, as well as
rights set out in Mexico's own domestic law, the mission identi-
fied five important areas relating to criminal practice and proce-
dure: (1) arrest and detention, (2) the taking and evidentiary
use of confessions, (3) legal defense and access to counsel, (4)
the protection of defense lawyers and human rights advocates,
and (5) the role of the judiciary. The investigation devoted par-
ticular attention to: inconsistencies between the law as written
and the actual practices of police and prosecutors in the treat-
ment of suspects; judicial independence; and reports of intimi-
dation of defense attorneys and human rights advocates.
As this Report documents, substantial evidence points to a
14. During the week before the delegation's arrival, Peggy Healy conducted sev-
eral preliminary interviews.
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pervasive failure of the rule of law in Mexico in the investigation
and prosecution of criminal cases, including: the arbitrary de-
tention of suspects, the systematic use of torture and other coer-
cive measures by police authorities to obtain confessions, the
failure to provide or permit access to competent defense coun-
sel, the routine use of coerced confessions to obtain convictions,
and the virtual absence of any judicial authority willing to ex-
amine, let alone remedy, these abuses.
In many cases, the victims of these abuses have been
charged with, and convicted of, serious crimes, including mur-
der, based on virtually no evidence other than confessions that
were coerced by torture or otherwise obtained illegally. Not sur-
prisingly, many of the victims of these abuses are poor, and are
unable to pay for competent legal counsel, or have been
targeted by local authorities who are able to use the justice sys-
tem, particularly in rural areas, to oppress their political or per-
sonal adversaries. But the victims of the breakdown in the rule
of law also include wealthy or otherwise influential members of
society, whose treatment reflects a criminal justice system more
committed to "solving" crimes than doing justice.
Each of these problems is not only a serious source of con-
cerns, but also implicates international human rights law. Sev-
eral matters that the delegation explored are especially troub-
ling. One is the demonstrable lack ofjudicial independence evi-
dent in the large number of the cases that we examined that
involve serious police and prosecutorial abuses. Mexico's justice
system differs markedly from the adversarial system of criminal
justice the United States adopted from the British, and from the
accusatorial system prevalent in much of Latin America and con-
tinental Europe. As Part V of this Report recounts, Mexico's jus-
tice system has historically evolved into a hybrid that some ex-
perts say embodies the worst elements of the inquisitorial and
accusatorial systems, with the result that prosecutorial powers
are virtually unchecked by an independent judiciary. Judges are
almost an afterthought, and play a role one legal scholar told us
was little more than "the parentheses" of a system dominated by
the prosecution.1" The result is a system where judges are rarely
15. See Interview with Renato Sales Heredia ("Renato Sales"), Chief Advisor, Mex-
ico City Attorney General's Office, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000); infra note 362
and accompanying text.
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present for what passes as a trial in Mexico. It is not at all unu-
sual for a judge to dismiss a well-founded claim of torture with
the observation that, if a beating by police did not produce visi-
ble lesions, "the law is very clear that there is no torture." 6
A further concern is equally fatal to a properly functioning
justice system-the lack of access to effective defense counsel.
The Mexican Constitution entitles every person "from the begin-
ning of the [criminal] process" to "an adequate defense" by an
attorney or other representative, or by "a public defender" if an
accused cannot name a representative.17 As Part III of this Re-
port details, for the 80% of those charged with crimes in Mexico
who are too poor to hire defense counsel, this is a right honored
mainly in the breach."8 Public defenders, where they are availa-
ble, lack the resources, training, and often the interest to pro-
vide any service that could even remotely be described as an ade-
quate defense. Even for those who can afford counsel, they are
routinely and systematically denied meaningful access to their
lawyers during the initial-and most crucial-phase of the crimi-
nal process, when the declaration of the accused is made before
the Public Ministry.
These failures are exacerbated by the treatment of defense
counsel who are perceived by some to be too effective in carry-
ing out their duties to their clients. The most shocking example
is the case of our colleague, Digna Ochoa, the Director of
PRODH's legal division, and one of the most capable and
respected defense attorneys in Mexico. As described below, 9 on
the night of October 29, 1999, Ms. Ochoa was attacked in her
Mexico City home, bound and blindfolded, and subjected to
nine hours of terrifying interrogation on PRODH's activities.
Ms. Ochoa's attackers have never been identified or appre-
hended. This Report documents several other assaults on, and
threats directed at, Ms. Ochoa, other PRODH staff members,
and other defense lawyers and human rights advocates. The
number and frequency of these unsolved attacks is too great to
suggest that they represent anything other than a systematic ef-
fort to intimidate lawyers and others engaged in criminal de-
16. Interview with Gonzalo Jesfis de Morales Avila, Judge, First District Court, in
Oaxaca, Mex. (June 2, 2000).
17. MEX. CONST. art. 20 § 4.
18. See infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
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fense work. The failure of Mexican law enforcement authorities
to adequately respond to these incidents is inexcusable. No re-
form in the Mexican justice system will be adequate to restore
the rule of law until the perpetrators of these attacks are them-
selves brought to justice.
Although this Report deals primarily with problems in the
justice system, it also documents the dedicated and often heroic
efforts of many Mexicans in and out of government to address
and correct these problems, and the great strides that have been
made in recent years in improving the system. We were particu-
larly impressed with, and appreciate, the willingness of the many
judges, prosecutors, police officials, and other government offi-
cials to discuss these issues.
Mexico boasts a number of outstanding institutions dedi-
cated to safeguarding the rights of detainees and criminal de-
fendants that have proven to be stalwart and invaluable advo-
cates of the rule of law. This group includes many exceptional
NGOs, attorneys, community activists, and academics, as well as
certain government officials. Since our visit to Mexico, a new
Federal administration has been installed under the leadership
of President Vicente Fox, who has been an outspoken propo-
nent of reforms in the Mexican justice system. Both the Crowley
Program and the PRODH hope that this Report and the recom-
mendations it contains will be useful in that effort.
This Report is divided into five parts, which track the main
issues that the mission examined. Part I examines the arbitrary
arrest and detention practices that are widespread in Mexico.
Part II explores the conditions and standards that lead to the
taking of coerced confessions, as well as the ready use of such
confessions at trial. In Part III, this Report turns to issues relat-
ing to legal representation in Mexico, especially the denial of
access to counsel at critical points of the criminal process. The
intimidation of defense attorneys, persons of confidence, and
human rights advocates furnishes the subject of Part IV. Finally,
Part V analyzes the role and performance of the Mexican judici-
ary, which represents a failed opportunity to redress many of the
problems that the Report elsewhere recounts. Aside from detail-
ing the mission's evidence, each section of the report discusses
applicable international and domestic standards, and concludes
with findings and recommendations.
HUMAN RIGHTS IN MEXICO
I. ARREST AND DETENTION
A. Introduction
Arbitrary detention is widespread in Mexico. ° Indeed, the
Inter-American Commission identified it as "one of the most se-
rious problems that occur in Mexico. '21 Illegal detention itself is
a violation of international human rights norms;22 however, it is
made more problematic by the fact that it often leads to other
types of human rights abuses, including torture. 23 This section
first describes international standards prohibiting arbitrary ar-
rests and detention that are binding on Mexico. It then de-
scribes Mexican law governing the requirement of a judicial war-
rant for arrest and the exceptions to that requirement. Finally,
the section describes and documents patterns and practices that
violate international law and police, prosecutorial, and judicial
procedures that contribute to those violations.
B. Mexico's Human Rights Obligations
1. International Human Rights Norms
Several international human rights instruments bear on the
problem of arbitrary arrest and detention, including the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights ("American Convention")
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
20. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SYSTEMIC INJUSTICE: TORTURE, DISAPPEARANCE,
AND EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTION IN MEXICO 1 (1999) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
SYSTEMIC INJUSTICE].
21. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico, OEA/Ser.L/
V/I1. 100 Doc. 7 Rev. 1, para. 219 (1998), available at http://www.iachr.org/annualrep/
99eng/Chapter3a.htm [hereinafter IACHR Report]. Most common in Tabasco, Guer-
rero, Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Mexico City, arbitrary detention is most often attributed to
the office of the state's Attorney General, the state police, and the army. See U.S. Dep't
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999: Mexico, at 840 (2000) [herein-
after U.S. State Dep't Report].
22. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22,
1969, art. 7(3), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (1969), 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into forceJuly 18, 1978)
[hereinafter American Convention] (stating that "[n]o one shall be subject to arbitrary
arrest or imprisonment").
23. A 1996 report of the CNDH found that more than 30% of 505 cases studied
involved arbitrary detention, which often led to physical mistreatment or prolonged
detention. See Nat'l Human Rights Comm'n, Procuracidn dejusticia y Derechos Humanos
20, 40 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 CNDH Report]. In its fourth periodic report to the
Human Rights Committee, Mexico cites lower figures: 6.2% and 8.5% (138 of 1605
cases) for May 1996 and June 1996, respectively. See MEXICO STATE REPORT TO U.N.
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., CCPR/C/123/Add.1 (1997).
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("ICCPR") ,24 both of which have been ratified by Mexico 25 and
are binding in Mexican courts. 26 Article 7(1) of the American
Convention guarantees the liberty and security of the individ-
ual. 27 Article 7(3) states that "[n]o one shall be subject to arbi-
trary arrest or imprisonment. ''22 Article 7(4) and 7(5) provide
that an individual, if detained, must be informed of the reasons
for the detention, notified of the charge, and promptly brought
before a judge or other official authorized to exercise judicial
power over the detainee. 29 Article 7(6) guarantees recourse to a
court for those detained so that the detention may be reviewed
for lawfulness and the detainee released if the detention is deter-
mined to have been unlawful.3 ° Finally, Article 22 guarantees an
individual freedom of movement."' Similarly, Article 9 of the
ICCPR prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, guarantees an
individual's right to be informed of the reasons for the arrest
and of the charge, and guarantees an individual's right to
brought promptly before a judge. 2 Article 9(5) also provides
for compensation for unlawful arrest or detention."
2. Domestic Law
Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution provides that, as a
general rule, an arrest may only be executed pursuant to a war-
rant issued by a judge.34 In order for the judge to issue an arrest
24. International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22,
1969, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
25. Mexico ratified the American Convention on March 24, 1981, and the ICCPR
on March 23, 1981. Mexico officially accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in December 1998.
26. The Mexican Constitution gives ratified treaties the status of domestic law. See
MEX. CONST. art. 133 (providing that "all treaties made .... shall be the Supreme Law
throughout the Union"). "The judges of every state shall be bound to the said ...
treaties, notwithstanding any contradictory provisions that may appear in the constitu-
tion or laws of the States." Id.
27. See American Convention art. 7(1) (stating that "[e]very person has the right to
personal liberty and security").
28. Id. art. 7(3).
29. Id. arts. 7(4), 7(5).
30. Id. art. 7(6).
31. Id. art. 22 (providing in part, that "[e]very person lawfully in the territory of a
State Party has the right to move about in it").
32. ICCPR art. 9.
33. Id.
34. See MEx. CONST. art. 16 (stating that "[n]o one shall be inconvenienced in their
person, family, home, papers or possessions, except by virtue of a written order of the
competent authority, that justifies and motivates the legal cause of the procedure").
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warrant, the prosecutor seeking a warrant must show that physi-
cal evidence of the crimes exists as well as evidence linking the
suspect to the commission of the crime.35 Article 16 further re-
quires that, once the suspect has been arrested pursuant to a
warrant, he must be brought before a judge "without delay."36
In theory, the judicial warrant requirement helps to prevent
arbitrary arrest and detention by ensuring the participation of a
decision-maker in the arrest determination who is more neutral
than the police or prosecutor who are responsible for identifying
and detaining criminals. Judicial participation not only guaran-
tees that sufficient grounds exist for arrest but also helps to pro-
tect the security of the detainee while in the custody of the po-
lice by providing the opportunity of judicial oversight of custody.
Nevertheless, despite the important function of the judicial war-
rant in safeguarding the human rights of detainees, recent con-
stitutional and statutory reforms in Mexico have limited the
force of the warrant requirement by expanding the scope of its
exceptions.
In 1993, reforms to the Mexican Constitution significantly
expanded the scope of the so-called urgent cases 37 exception to
the warrant requirement. Article 16 now expressly allows the
Public Ministry to order arrests in urgent cases and defines such
cases as any situation involving a serious crime when there is a
risk that the suspect may evade justice and the Public Ministry
cannot go to the judicial authority for reasons relating to time,
place, or circumstance.3" Prior to 1993, this exception allowed
warrantless arrests only in cases involving a serious crime, the
risk that the suspect would evade authorities, and where there
was no judicial authority available in the area.39 By expressly au-
thorizing warrantless arrest when the Public Ministry cannot ob-
tain a warrant for reasons of time, place, or circumstance, the
amendment to Article 16 expands both the circumstances under
35. Id. Specifically, Article 16 requires evidence that the accused is probably re-
sponsible for the crime. Id.
36. Id. Article 16 further provides that failure to present the accused immediately
to judicial authority "will be punished by penal law." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure
and Practice in Mexico 7 n.28 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Ele-
ments of Criminal Procedure].
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which warrantless arrest is permitted and the discretion of the
Public Ministry to determine whether those circumstances exist.
Moreover, the Constitution does not define or limit the set of
crimes classified as serious. 4' Rather, this set of crimes-and
therefore the scope of the urgent cases exception-is deter-
mined by the codes of criminal procedure of each jurisdiction
and has generally been expanding in recent years to encompass
a broader range of offenses.41
Article 16 also provides that any person may detain an indi-
vidual without a warrant if the individual is apprehended en
flagrante.4 2 This exception to the warrant requirement has ex-
isted in the Mexican Constitution since 1917 and is common in
many Latin American countries.43 In recent years, however, the
exception has been expanded by statute well beyond its original
limited scope, which permitted the apprehension of a suspect in
the act of committing a crime.44 For example, Article 193 of the
Federal Code of Criminal Procedure ("FCCP") provides that an
en flagrante arrest occurs: (1) When the suspect is apprehended
in the act of committing a crime, (2) when the suspect is appre-
hended immediately after committing the crime and is physi-
cally followed away from the scene of the crime, or (3) in cases
of serious crimes, during a forty-eight hour period after the
crime was committed, when the victim, a witness, or a co-partici-
pant in the crime identifies the suspect or the suspect is found
with the instruments or product of the crime in his possession or
when there exist other indicia leading to a reasonable presump-
tion that he had participated in the crime.45 Article 267 of the
Mexico City Code of Criminal Procedure ("MCCCP") provides a
parallel definition for arrest en flagrante but extends the window
40. See MEx. CONST. art 16 (describing the set as crimes qualified as major).
41. See Decree Reforming and Adding Various Dispositions to the MCCCP and to
the Organic Law for the Superior Court of Justice for Mexico City, art. 268, cited in
Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra note 39, at 7
n.29 (changing the method for determining which crimes would be defined as serious
and expanding that category).
42. MEX. CONsT. art. 16. The person must then be turned over to the judicial
police and then to the Public Ministry. Id. In practice, however, the person detaining
the suspect is usually an agent of the judicial police or Public Ministry. Id.
43. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 8.
44. Id.
45. See FCCP art. 193.
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for warrantless arrest to seventy-two hours.4 6
This recent expansion of the exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement also has implications for the conditions of custody of
the detainees. In cases involving ajudicial warrant, the detainee
must be presented immediately to the judge.4" In cases falling
within either the en flagrante or urgent cases exceptions to the
warrant requirement, however, the detainee is turned over to
the Public Ministry rather than to the judge.4" The Public Minis-
try is then authorized to hold the detainee in its own installa-
tions for a period of forty-eight hours in most cases and up to
ninety-six hours in certain cases before presenting the detainee
to a judge.4 9
C. Problems
1. Breadth of Exceptions
The general requirement of a warrant, coupled with these
very broad exceptions, provides a basis for Mexican officials in-
terviewed by the delegation to claim that arbitrary detention is
rare (or even nonexistent) in Mexico." It is rare, they argue,
because either a warrant is obtained or the case falls within one
of the two exceptions to the requirement.51 Although such ar-
rests may technically be legal under Mexican law, the breadth of
the exceptions undermines the protective value of the warrant
requirement to such a degree that many of these legal arrests
must be regarded as arbitrary and, therefore, in violation of in-
ternational human rights norms. This is true for several reasons.
The first and most basic reason is that the breadth of the
exceptions removes large numbers of cases from the protection
46. See MCCCP art 267.
47. MEX. CONST. art. 16.
48. Id.
49. Id. Specifically, the Constitution provides that "[n]o accused shall be retained
by the Public Ministry for more than forty-eight hours... ; this period may be doubled
in those cases that the laws prescribes as organized delinquency." Id.
50. See, e.g., Interview with Francisco Javier RuizJim~nez, First Visitor, Mexico City
Human Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000) (stating that in "a
significant number of cases [involving arbitrary arrest] we find that the detention was
not arbitrary"). "We find that the suspect was detained en flagrancia." Id.
51. See, e.g., Interview with MoisdsJim~nez, federal prosecutor, in Guerrero, Mex.
Uune 5, 2000) (stating that "[a] rbitrary detention does not exist"). "Whether or not a
detention is arbitrary depends on your point of view. There are only three types of
detentions in the law: enflagrancia, urgent cases, or with a warrant." Id.
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of the warrant requirement without ensuring that other indicia
of guilt are present. For example, the en flagrancia exception, if
confined to cases in which the defendant is interrupted in the
commission of a crime or followed from the scene of the crime,
is a reasonable accommodation of the demands of effective po-
licing. The very circumstances that make it impossible to obtain
a warrant, apprehending the defendant in the act, also serve to
ensure the legitimacy of the arrest. The expansion of the en
flagrancia exception to include arrest up to forty-eight hours af-
ter the commission of the crime undermines both the justifica-
tion for foregoing the warrant, the immediacy of the crime, and
the indicia of reliability, apprehending the defendant in the act.
As Professor Miguel Sarre observed, "With the en flagrancia ex-
ception, it is enough if anyone fingers the individual as having
committed the crime within 48 hours.
52
The urgent cases exception goes even further, allowing war-
rantless arrest in any case in which the crime was sufficiently seri-
ous and obtaining a warrant would be sufficiently inconvenient
for the Public Ministry. This exception is in no way connected to
any indicia of reliability or procedural safeguards to ensure the
proper exercise of police powers. Rather, the exception is sim-
ply a matter of expediency, reflecting a policy determination to
sacrifice the rights of the detainee in the interest of expanded
police discretion in cases involving crimes deemed serious.
2. Exercise of Discretion by Police and the Public Ministry
The exceptions to the warrant requirement also encourage
practices that violate international law by allowing the Public
Ministry to exercise substantial discretion. For example, the ur-
gent cases exception will apply when it is impossible to seek a
warrant from a judge for one of several reasons: time, place, or
other circumstance."3 The Public Ministry, or more commonly
the judicial police, must make the determination of what consti-
tutes impossibility in the first instance. The language of the con-
stitutional exception provides very little guidance on this point.
Similarly, the expanded enflagrancia exception requires other in-
dicia leading to the probable responsibility of the suspect's par-
52. Interview with Miguel Sarre, Professor of Law, Autonomous Technical Institute
of Mexico, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
53. MEX. CONST. art. 16.
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ticipation in the crime;54 however, what constitutes other indicia
or probable responsibility is left unspecified in the law and is
again determined, in the first instance, by the judicial police or
public ministry. As noted earlier, in order to obtain an arrest
warrant, the prosecutor must produce evidence that the suspect
is probably responsible for the crime.55 In contrast, the codes of
criminal procedure do not specify the level of suspicion neces-
sary to detain an individual under either the urgent cases excep-
tion or the expanded en flagrancia exception. Thus, if the case
falls within one of these exceptions, the individual may be ini-
tially detained on very little evidence.
3. Examples of Abuse of Discretion
The delegation encountered a number of cases vividly illus-
trating the potential for abuse created by the exceptions to the
warrant requirement.56 For example, in February 1995, police in
Yanga, Veracruz, detained a group of seven individuals accused
of cooperating with the National Zapatista Liberation Army
("EZLN") . 5 7 Although the police had no warrant for their ar-
rest, the authorities argued that they detained the defendants
pursuant to the en flagrancia exception to the warrant require-
ment.58  Specifically, they stated that law enforcement agents
54. See FCCP art. 193; see also MCCCP art. 267.
55. MEX. CONST. art. 16.
56. Although many of our interviews with detainees awaiting trial confirm the con-
tinuing prevalence of abusive practices, we emphasize several older cases in this report
because the allegations of abuse have been investigated and confirmed by the national
or state human rights commissions.
57. The National Zapatista Liberation Army ("EZLN") is mainly composed of Ma-
yan Indians living in the Chiapas region of Mexico. See Raidza Torres Wick, Revisiting
the Emerging International Norm on Indigenous Rights: Autonomy as an Option, 25 YALE J.
IN-r'L. L. 291 n.21 (1991). The EZLN's main goal is to guarantee cultural rights for
indigenous people. See Margarita Gonzlez de Pazos, Mexico Since the Mayan Uprising:
Government and Zapatista Strategies, 10 ST. THOMAs L. REv. 159, 160 (1997). In 1993, the
Mexican Constitution was amended to include language that guarantees these rights.
Id. Despite the progress in protecting indigenous rights, in practice, violations of their
cultural rights occur routinely and there are still sporadic armed encounters between
paramilitary groups and indigenous peoples. See, e.g., Pilar Franco, Rights-Mexico: In-
digenous People in Hiding from Army Harassment, Inter Press Service, June 7, 1999, 1999
WL 5949042. The defendants were eventually transferred to Mexico City where they
were held in the custody of the police and the Public Ministry and, according to the
findings of the CNDH, tortured and forced to sign inculpatory statements. See Recom-
mendation 50/95, CNDH GACETA, Mar. 5, 1995, at 84 [hereinafter CNDH Recommen-
dation 50/95].
58. CNDH Recommendation 50/95, supra note 57, at 91.
2001]
816 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:801
originally entered the house to execute a four-year old arrest
warrant.59 According to police, once they were inside the house,
they found weapons and other evidence of EZLN activity.6 ° The
1991 arrest warrant that served as a pretext for entering the
house, however, had been issued in connection with a homicide
that was entirely unrelated to this case.6" As a result, the Mexi-
can National Human Rights Commission ("CNDH") concluded
that the authorities had illegally entered the home and had in-
tentionally used the earlier unrelated investigation and warrant
so as to avoid the need to obtain a proper arrest warrant in this
case.
62
More recently, in a case that has attracted international at-
tention, two environmental activists, Rodolfo Montiel and Teo-
doro Cabrera, were illegally detained by soldiers who claimed
that the defendants had been found with drugs and weapons in
their possession.6  The two men were held for several days
before being turned over to the Public Ministry.64 During this
period, they were tortured, forced to sign confessions, and pho-
tographed with illegal weapons." As in the Yanga case, the evi-
dence had been fabricated as a justification for the illegal deten-
tion." Notwithstanding the CNDH recommendation, Montiel
and Cabrera were convicted in August 2000, based largely on
this questionable evidence and the confessions they signed and
later retracted, alleging torture.67
4. Few Judicial Safeguards
A further problem with the warrant exceptions is that, in
addition to allowing the initial arrest to take place withoutjudi-
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See CNDH Recommendation 8/2000, CNDH GACETA, July 14, 2000, at 15, 20
[hereinafter CNDH Recommendation 8/2000].
64. See PRODH, Silencing Environmentalist Activists in Guerrero, Mexico: The Case of
Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.sjsocial.org/
PRODH/boletin/spbul.htm [hereinafter PRODH, Silencing Environmental Activists];
see also CNDH Recommendation 8/2000, supra note 63 (finding that defendants were
held in the custody of soldiers for at least two and a half days).
65. See Press Release, PRODH, Judge Convicts Mexican Environmentalists Teo-
doro Cabrera and Rodolfo Montiel (Aug. 29, 2000).
66. See id.
67. See id.
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cial oversight, the criminal procedure codes do not provide for
immediate judicial review of the circumstances of arrest and de-
tention. Perhaps most problematically, the warrant exceptions
specifically allow for a period of unsupervised detention before
the detainee must be presented to a judge. 8 In cases in which
an arrest is executed pursuant to a judicial warrant, the Constitu-
tion requires that the detainee be brought immediately before a
judge and transferred to judicially supervised custody.6 9 Inexpli-
cably, in cases of warrantless arrest, when immediate judicial
oversight of custody seems even more critical, the Constitution
and codes of criminal procedure allow a period ranging from
forty-eight to ninety-six hours before the detainee must be
brought before a judge.7 ° Because there may be no official re-
cord of the arrest, the detainee is extremely vulnerable to abuse
during this period.7" Indeed, the defendants in the Yanga and
Montiel cases, allege that they were tortured prior to being
turned over to the Public Ministry, allegations that were con-
firmed by the CNDH.12
In addition to the opportunities for abuse created by the
exceptions to the warrant requirement, Mexican law provides
few disincentives to the police or Public Ministry for the liberal
use and abuse of the exceptions. For example, despite the vul-
nerability of detainees to coercion following a warrantless arrest,
no per se rule exists for the exclusion of a confession made to
the Public Ministry during a detention that is later determined
to have been illegal.7" In other words, even if the judge decides
68. MEX. CONST. art. 16.
69. See id.
70. See id.; FCCP art. 193; MCCCP art. 267. Specifically, the Mexican Constitution
provides for detention of up to 96 hours before a defendant is brought before ajudge,
whereas the FCCP allows up to 72 hours and the MCCCP allows up to 48 hours.
71. Actually, this period may be much longer if the judicial police manipulate the
time or date of the arrest. See, e.g., Interview with Adalberto Jorge Pacheco Santiago,
defendant, in Oaxaca, Mex. (May 30, 2000) (stating that he was detained by the judicial
police for four months before he was brought to the Public Ministry's office, and that
he was tortured extensively during this period); Interview with Israel Ochoa Lara
("Israel Ochoa"), defense attorney, in Oaxaca, Mex. (May 30, 2000) (explaining that
one of his clients, Soloman Sebastian Herndndez, was "arrested with an arrest warrant
[and]... should have been immediately brought before a judge ... but instead they
brought him for interrogation"). "[T]his interrogation does not appear at all in his
case file." Id.
72. See CNDH Recommendation 50/95, supra note 57; CNDH Recommendation
8/2000, supra note 63.
73. In contrast, when a detention exceeds established time limits, any confession
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that the arrest of the individual did not fall within either excep-
tion to the warrant requirement and was therefore illegal, the
judge will not necessarily exclude evidence gathered or a confes-
sion made during the period of illegal detention. Rather, if
the detainee seeks to retract the confession, he will have to prove
that it was coerced.75 Because there is no automatic exclusion of
evidence obtained as a result of an illegal warrantless arrest, the
Public Ministry and the judicial police have little incentive to
curtail the practice.
Again, the Yanga case described above76 provides an exam-
ple. There, the trial court rejected the defense's argument that
the search and en flagrancia detentions had been illegal. The
court also indicated that, even assuming the illegality of the ac-
tions of the police, this illegality would not affect the decision on
the guilt of the accused.7 7 The court stated that, at most, the
illegality of the search and detention would allow the defendants
to present a cause of action against the authorities for the im-
proper entry into their home.7" The trial court thereby estab-
lished that, even if the illegality of the arrest and detentions were
proved, the validity of the evidence and documents obtained
through those acts would not be affected. The appellate court
partially reversed the trial court decision in this regard and
found that the search of the house was illegal.79 The court did
not rule on the allegations that the detentions were illegal.80
Although the delegation is not prepared to draw a conclu-
sion regarding the frequency of arbitrary arrest and detention, it
obtained is presumed to have been coerced and therefore invalid. See MCCCP art. 134;
FCCP art. 134.
74. See Legal Weekly for the Federation, Collegial Circuit Courts, Fifth Epoch at
app. 163, cited in Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure,
supra note 39, at 9 n.37 (Mexico Supreme Court holding that evidence establishing the
arbitrary detention of a suspect does not require finding that suspect's confession was
coerced). But see "PNrez Garcfa, Salvador," 84 S.J.F. 49 (7 6poca 1975) (detaining of a
suspect by police officers before the charges are presented implies coercion of the per-
son and, hence, the resulting confession is considered lacking in veracity).
75. See infra notes 149-69 and accompanying text (discussing defendant's burden
of proving coercion).
76. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
77. See Decision of the Sixth District Court on Criminal Matters for the Federal
District, Aug. 20, 1996, at 169.
78. See id.
79. See Decision of the Third Unitary Federal Circuit Court for Mexico City, Mex.,
Jan. 3, 1997, at 63.
80. See id.
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is clear that the Yanga and Montiel cases are not exceptional.
The delegation heard numerous credible allegations of the use
of fabricated or planted evidence, expired warrants, and false
witness identifications as pretexts for warrantless arrests. Unfor-
tunately, because these same techniques can be used to fabricate
evidence that may serve as the basis for a judicial arrest warrant,
the requirement of a judicial warrant would not entirely elimi-
nate the problem of illegal arrest and detention. Nevertheless,
by ensuring judicial participation and perhaps closer judicial su-
pervision post-arrest, it would reduce the opportunities for po-
lice to act arbitrarily and then justify their actions after the fact.
D. Recommendations
* Narrow the exception to the warrant requirement for so-
called urgent cases to restrict its application to the most
serious categories of crimes and to emphasize the likeli-
hood that the defendant will evade justice if a warrant is
sought.
" Restrict the Public Ministry's use of the urgent cases ex-
ception by clearly defining the set of circumstances under
which the Public Ministry may be deemed unable to ac-
quire a warrant. These circumstances should be rare, and
the burden should be on the Public Ministry to establish
that the strict criteria are met.
" Narrow the en flagrancia exception to circumstances in
which the suspect is apprehended in the act of commit-
ting the crime or followed from the scene of the crime.
" Eliminate the 48-hour period during which the suspect
may be held by the Public Ministry following a warrantless
arrest and, instead, require immediate presentation of the
suspect before a judge.
" In any case of warrantless arrest, establish a presumption
of illegality, requiring the Public Ministry to prove that
the requirements of the exception were met and that the
suspect was presented immediately to appropriate judicial
authority.
* Amend codes of criminal procedure to require the exclu-
sion of any evidence gathered in connection with an ar-
rest later deemed illegal.
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II. TAKING AND EVIDENTIARY USE OF CONFESSIONS
A. Introduction
As described in the foregoing section, problematic police
practices, coupled with broad and vaguely defined exceptions to
the warrant requirement, create opportunities for intimidation
and abuse of detainees in Mexico. The delegation's wide-rang-
ing interviews generated strong, though anecdotal, support for
the conclusion that intimidation and abuse of detainees remain
serious problems in the Mexican criminal justice system. The
persistence of the problem of abuse and torture is confirmed by
studies conducted by Mexican NGOs and governmental
groups,"' as well as international governmental and non-govern-
mental human rights organizations.82
Based on such reports and upon our own interviews, we are
convinced that mistreatment of detainees remains a serious
problem in the Mexican criminal justice system; however, docu-
menting the prevalence of such abusive practices was not a focus
of our mission. Rather, beginning with the well-grounded as-
sumption that torture remains a problem, the delegation ex-
plored various ways in which the system encourages, or fails ade-
quately to discourage, such abuse. For example, Part I demon-
strated how exceptions to the warrant requirement provide
opportunities for abuse.83 Additionally, Part III argues that, by
denying meaningful access to counsel in the preliminary investi-
gation stage, Mexican criminal procedure codes eliminate one
81. See Interview with Dr. Jost Luis Soberanes, President of the CNDH, in Mexico
City, Mex. (June 5, 2000) (noting that "[t]en years ago, there were many more instances
of torture but it still exists"). Dr. Soberanes responded to the delegation's request for
statistics by acknowledging that "there have not been any major studies on this. Re-
searching torture is a difficult task-we would have a research task of inductive ap-
proaches." Id.
82. See IACHR Report, supra note 21, para. 303 (noting that "even though Mexico
has a broad legal framework for the prevention, eradication, and punishment of acts of
torture, torture and the impunity of the perpetrators continue to pose a serious prob-
lem"); U.S. State Dep't Report, supra note 21, at 839 (stating that "the police regularly
obtain information through torture, prosecutors use this evidence in courts, and the
courts continue to admit as evidence confessions extracted under torture"); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN MExico: A Poucv OF IMPUNITv 9 (1997) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLICY OF IMPUNITY] (noting that "[t]orture is endemic in Mex-
ico"); U.N. GAOR, Final Observations of the Committee Against Torture: Mexico, A/
52/44 paras. 153-70 (1997); U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/38/
Add.2.
83. See supra Part I.
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of the most effective and internationally recognized means of
protecting the safety of detainees and ensuring due process.8 4
Focusing on the procedures surrounding the taking of confes-
sions and their use at trial, this section suggests that these proce-
dures fail to adequately discourage practices of intimidation and
coercion by privileging early statements taken before the Public
Ministry and by placing an exceedingly high burden on the de-
fendant to prove allegations of abuse.
B. Mexico's Human Rights Obligations
1. International Standards
Several international human rights treaties binding on Mex-
ico require that courts exclude from consideration at trial any
confession obtained through coercion. Both the American Con-
vention and the ICCPR establish that criminal defendants may
not be compelled to confess guilt and that a confession shall be
valid only if it is made without coercion of any kind. 5 The
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has inter-
preted the relevant provisions of the ICCPR as requiring a prohi-
bition on the admissibility in judicial proceedings of statements
or confessions obtained through torture or other prohibited
treatment.86 The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture is even more explicit. It provides that "[n]o
statement that is verified as having been obtained through tor-
ture shall be admissible as evidence in a legal proceeding."" Fi-
nally, with respect to Mexico, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee ("Human Rights Committee") 8 has recently urged
84. See infta Part III.
85. See American Convention art. 8(3) (stating that "[a] confession of guilt by the
accused shall be valid only if it is made without coercion of any kind"); ICCPR art.
14(3) (g) (providing that "[i]n the determination of any criminal charge against him,
everyone shall be entitled not to be compelled to testify against himself, or to confess
guilt").
86. Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or
Punishment, General Comment 20, U.N. HCHR, 44th Sess., para. 12 (1992) (stating that
"the law must prohibit the use of admissibility in judicial proceedings of statements or
confessions obtained through torture or other prohibited treatment").
87. Inter-Am. Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, art. 10, O.A.S.T.S., No.
67 (1987) [hereinafter Inter-Am. Convention to Prevent Torture].
88. The Human Rights Committee is charged with enforcing the rights enumer-
ated in the ICCPR. See generally DOMINIC McGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE:
ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITI-
cAL RIGHTS (1991).
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Mexico to take steps to ensure that confessions obtained by force
cannot be used as evidence in trial proceedings.89
2. Domestic Law
On its face, Mexican law forbids the use of coerced confes-
sions as evidence in criminal proceedings. For example, Article
20 of the Mexican Constitution explicitly prohibits torture and
provides that a declaration must be voluntary.9" The Federal
Law for the Prevention and Sanction of Torture ("Federal Law
to Prevent Torture") is more explicit, criminalizing acts of tor-
ture and providing that "no confession or information obtained
through torture may be used as evidence."91  Similarly, most
states have passed statutes criminalizing acts of torture.92
Although these prohibitions on torture and the use of co-
erced confessions are important, their interpretation and appli-
cation in the context of criminal procedure ultimately deter-
mine their efficacy. Hence, as a prophylactic measure, Article 20
of the Constitution provides that a confession must be made
before the Public Ministry or a judge and in the presence of
counsel or person of confidence93 in order to have evidentiary
value.94 More to the point, confessions rendered to the judicial
police are inadmissible, whether or not they are voluntary.95 En-
acted in response to the problem of mistreatment of detainees
by judicial police, this limitation of the use of declarations to
those rendered before the Public Ministry or a judge has been
credited by Mexican officials with a significant reduction in the
89. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Mexico, U.N. H. R.
Comm., ccpr/c/79/Add.109, para 7, 66th Sess., para. 7 (1999) [hereinafter Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Mexico].
90. MEX. CONST. art. 20. (providing that "the defendant shall not be obliged to
declare" and that "intimidation or torture are forbidden and will be punished under
the criminal law").
91. La Ley Federal para Prevenir y Sancionar la Tortura [Federal Law to Prevent and
Sanction Torture], reprinted in EL DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACIfON EL 27 DE DICIEMBRE
DE 1991 (1991) [hereinafter Federal Law to Prevent Torture]. The criminal procedure
codes of the states and the Federal District also provide that a confession must be volun-
tary in order to have evidentiary value. See, e.g., FCCP art. 287; MCCCP art. 249.
92. Torture, however, is not a crime in the state of Yucatan.
93. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
94. MEX. CONST. art. 20. For a discussion of the role of counsel at the declaration
stage, see infra notes 187-218 and accompanying text.
95. The MCCCP and the FCCP further codify this constitutional prohibition on
the use of confessions taken by the judicial police. See FCCP art. 287; MCCCP art. 249.
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level of torture.96
Finally, amendments to the codes of criminal procedure
have reduced the evidentiary centrality of confessions in the trial
and conviction of a defendant. For example, the FCCP provides
that "a confession alone cannot serve as the basis for charges
brought by the Public Ministry against a defendant.""7 These
codes also provide that a confession cannot be accepted if other
evidence undermines its truthfulness.98 As many judges and
prosecutors explained to the delegation, following these
changes, the confession is no longer considered the "queen of
evidence.""
C. Problems
1. Taking of Confessions by the Public Ministry
Although the reforms described above may have reduced
the level of abuse of detainees by the judicial police, they have
not fully addressed the problem of coerced confessions for sev-
eral reasons. First, although domestic law defines statements
taken by judicial police as inadmissible at trial, it does not pro-
hibit police interrogation of detainees. Hence, police are free to
question detainees during the period before they are presented
to the judge to render a formal declaration.
In cases of warrantless arrest, this period may legally last up
to forty-eight hours in most cases and up to ninety-six hours in
certain cases. 100 As a practical matter, it often lasts much longer.
According to Renato Sales, Chief Advisor for the Mexico City
Attorney General's Office, "the forty-eight hour rule is inter-
96. See, e.g., Interview with Dr. Luis de la Barreda Solorzano, President, Mexico
City Human Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 31, 2000) (asserting that
"[t] en years ago, torture occurred in practically every case"). "After the new law against
torture was passed, it took all validity away from confessions taken by police. Because of
this, the rate of torture has diminished spectacularly." Id.
97. FCCP art. 287; see also MCCCP art. 59.
98. See, e.g., MCCCP art. 249.
99. See, e.g., Interview with Maclovio Murillo Chvez, Federal CourtJudge, in Guer-
rero, Mex. (June 5, 2000) (stating that "in our penal system, we no longer give full
validity to confessions"). "Confessions become only an indicia, not dispositive. Now the
queen of evidence' is circumstantial." Id.
100. MEx. CONST. art. 16. Renato Sales notes that the availability of this 48-hour
period actually creates an incentive for the police to proceed under one of the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement even when obtaining a warrant might be possible. See
Interview with Renato Sales, Chief Advisor, Mexico City Attorney General's Office, in
Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
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preted by the Public Ministry to begin running at the time the
Public Ministry gets the defendant rather than the time the judi-
cial police pick him up."10 1 Thus, the defendant may remain in
the unsupervised custody of the judicial police for a significant
period of time, often unrecorded, before the 48-hour period of
custody by the Public Ministry begins.
Because this extended period of custody by the judicial po-
lice is often unsupervised by either the Public Ministry or by
counsel, 10 2 it presents a significant opportunity for abuse of de-
tainees. Indeed, the Inter-American Commission found that
"most cases of torture and of cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment occur in the context of the criminal justice system,
mainly during the early stages of investigation of criminal of-
fenses."1 °3 Numerous interviews by the delegation with detain-
ees and defense lawyers confirmed this finding. For example,
Alvaro Sebastian Ramirez, an indigenous Zapotec from San
Agustin, Loxichas, reported that he was kidnapped by the judi-
cial police, detained for eleven days, tortured, and forced to sign
over one hundred blank sheets of paper.' 4 Recounting his ex-
perience, he told the delegation that:
They put my hands over my head, gave electric shocks to my
genitals, and put chili pepper in my nose. They beat me with
rifle butts and on the back, on the legs, on my head, they just
kept beating me .... Every three days they would give me
some filthy water. I had a hood on for eleven days, except
when they gave me water to drink and when I had to sign.
They told me that they had already raped my daughter, and
that they would kill me last. They wanted me to confess that I
101. Interview with Renato Sales, Chief Advisor, Mexico City Attorney General's
Office, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
102. Although Article 20 (IX) of the Mexican Constitution provides that a criminal
suspect has a right to adequate representation from the beginning of the criminal pro-
ceedings, this provision has been interpreted as guaranteeing the defendant the right
to access to counsel only upon rendering his formal declaration before the Public Min-
istry. As a result, detainees are not routinely provided access to an attorney during the
period in which they are detained and questioned by the Judicial Police. See infra notes
187-218 (discussing access to counsel).
103. IACHR Report, supra note 21, para. 305.
104. Interview with Alvaro Sebastidn Ramfrez, defendant, Etla Prison, in Oaxaca,
Mex. (June 1, 2000). Mr. Sebastitn Ramfrez told the delegation that he expected that
the police would use the signed sheets to manufacture accusations against others. Id.
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was a major in the EPR [Popular Revolutionary Army] 105
Mr. Sebastidin Ramfrez's case was not unique or even unusual;
the delegation interviewed a number of other individuals who
reported abuse at the hands of the judicial police and heard re-
ports of still other cases from defense attorneys. When ques-
tioned about such cases of abuse, Dr. Luis de la Barreda So-
larzano, President of the Human Rights Commission of Mexico
City, remarked to the delegation that "judicial police act practi-
cally without any control. The Constitution says that they are
within the control of the Public Ministry but in reality they are
not under [its] authority-they are out of control."' 0 6
Although statements made by detainees during this period
of custody by the judicial police are not admissible, the abusive
practices persist because they can have an important impact on
confessions that are admissible. This happens in at least two
ways. First, the Public Ministry may be directly implicated in the
coercion by participating in or overseeing the abuse and intimi-
dation of detainees. For example, Joel Martinez Gonzdlez, a de-
fendant accused of guarding arms for the EZLN in Cacaloma-
can, reported that the police beat him and forced him to confess
that he was a member of the EZLN.' °7 He and the other defend-
ants were then taken to the Public Ministry with bags over their
heads and were forced to declare formally what they had been
made to confess to police.'0 8 Mr. Martinez Gonzdlez informed
the delegation that Public Ministry and police agents "made up
my declaration. They added things to my preparatory declara-
tion. They made me sign, grabbing my wrist and making me
sign. 109
Obviously, if the Public Ministry participates in the coer-
cion, a requirement that a confession be made before the Public
Ministry serves as no protection against the use of coerced con-
fessions. Yet, even when agents of the Public Ministry do not
105. Id. When interviewed by the delegation, Mr. SebastiAn Ramfrez was being
held in preventive detention at Etla Prison in Oaxaca. Id.
106. See Interview with Dr. Luis de la Barreda Solarzano, President, Mexico City
Human Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 31, 2000).
107. See Interview with Joel Martinez Gonzalez and Gonzalo Sanchez Navarete, de-
fendants, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 3, 2000).
108. Id. (recounting that "I was forced to make my declaration"). "They
threatened me. They grabbed my wrist to make me sign. I didn't want to-I was hit in
the head and forced to sign." Id.
109. Id.
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directly engage in coercive or intimidating practices during the
declaration, the detainee's statement is necessarily affected by
the lingering threat of police custody. The significance of this
threat was apparent in the delegation's interviews with detainees
and has been confirmed by the work of other NGOs. The Law-
yers Committee notes that "[s] ince the Public Ministry will often
return the suspect into police custody if he makes an 'unsatisfac-
tory' declaration, it is logical that the suspect will seek to make a
declaration that placates the Public Ministry."11 According to
Human Rights Watch, "even if a detainee is not tortured at the
time of making a statement, torture by police prior to delivery to
prosecutors can be just as effective in ensuring that a confession
turns out as police desire." '
Defense lawyers in Mexico who were interviewed by the del-
egation shared this view. For example, Pilar Noriega, an active
human rights lawyer in Mexico City, remarked that she had "sev-
eral cases where the person, in spite of giving testimony, was
threatened with torture if he was not giving everything that the
police wanted."' 12 Indeed, many defense lawyers have such little
confidence in the voluntariness of the declaration made before
the Public Ministry under the threat of police custody that they
decline to be present in order to avoid ratifying a coerced state-
ment. 3
2. Taking of Confessions before a Judge
In addition to declarations made before the Public Ministry,
Mexican law provides that declarations made before ajudge and
in the presence of counsel or a person of confidence are admissi-
ble at trial. 14 Defense lawyers and human rights groups in Mex-
ico tend to regard such statements as more reliable than those
made before the Public Ministry, but for reasons that have little
to do with the fact of judicial oversight of the hearing itself.
Rather, a detainee's declaration before ajudge usually coincides
with his transfer from the custody of the judicial police to a regu-
110. Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 19.
111. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SYSTEMIC INJUSTICE, supra note 20, at 40.
112. Interview with Pilar Noriega Garcia ("Pilar Noriega") and Digna Ochoa Y
PlIcido ("Digna Ochoa"), defense attorneys, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
113. See id.
114. MEX. CONST. art. 20.
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lar detention center. By eliminating the threat that the detainee
will be returned to the control of the judicial police, this transfer
of custody alleviates somewhat the climate of intimidation.115
Despite a reduction of the risk of intimidation when a de-
tainee makes his declaration before a judge, the participation of
a judge does not entirely resolve the problem. This is true for
several reasons. First, even though the detainee may no longer
be in the custody of the judicial police, he may legitimately fear
that the police may act against his family or friends if he fails to
cooperate before the judge. For example, on June 25, 1996, En-
rique and Adridn Aranda Ochoa were arrested without a warrant
in connection with a robbery and were subsequently charged
with a kidnapping that had taken place in 1995.116 Upon their
arrest, the brothers were taken to the police station and later to
two different Public Ministry installations in Mexico City.1" 7 At
each place, they were severely tortured by preventive and judicial
police.1 " As a result of the torture, they signed two separate
confessions, one at each of the Public Ministry installations." 9
The Aranda brothers assert that the judicial police who coerced
them into signing the Public Ministry declarations later
threatened them and their families with further abuse if they did
not ratify their declarations before the judge. 2 ° Indeed, imme-
diately before giving their first judicial declarations, the detain-
ees spoke by telephone with their parents who told them that a
judicial police vehicle was parked near their home.1 21 Based on
the threats and their concern for their family, the defendants
ratified their Public Ministry confessions before the judge. 122
Second, by the time he is brought before a judge, the de-
tainee may have made an earlier declaration before the Public
115. For this reason, many human rights groups, including the IACHR, have rec-
ommended restricting declarations to judicially-supervised hearings, eliminating Public
Ministry declarations altogether. See IACHR Report, supra note 21, para. 318.
116. See Interview with Enrique and Adridn Aranda Ochoa, defendants, North
Prison, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 2, 2000).
117. See id.
118. See id. (Adridn Aranda Ochoa explained that "the torture included blows and
kicks to parts of my body .... They put a plastic bag over my face and struck me in the
stomach and asphyxiated me").
119. See id.
120. See id. (Enrique Aranda Ochoa stated that "what was important to me was the
threats to our families, parents, and sisters, to our women companions, and to us").
121. See id.
122. See id.
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Ministry that was tainted by intimidation or abuse. Although the
subsequent judicial declaration may, in theory, be made under
less threatening circumstances for the reasons already men-
tioned, if the detainee retracts an earlier confession and insists
that he was coerced, the judge is very likely to discredit the re-
traction pursuant to the principle of procedural immediacy.
As understood throughout Latin America, and by the Inter-
American Commission, the principle of procedural immediacy
places greatest weight on a statement made to the judge, empha-
sizing the importance of the judge's ability to assess the evidence
directly. 2 ' In Mexico, however, this principle is understood
quite differently-it creates a presumption that the first or "most
immediate" statement of the defendant after arrest should be
given the greatest credibility.124 Yet, as noted above, the de-
tainee often makes this first statement at a point at which he is
very vulnerable-in the control of the Public Ministry and under
threat of custody by the judicial police. Thus, Mexico's interpre-
tation of the principle of procedural immediacy converts what is
intended to function as a procedural protection for the accused
into the opposite-an incentive for the abuse of the rights of
accused.
Although Mexican authorities have argued that the link be-
tween procedural immediacy and coerced confessions was ad-
dressed by the 1993 revisions to the Constitution prohibiting the
use of confessions rendered before the Judicial Police, 1 5 courts
continue to invoke the principle to privilege the declaration
before the Public Ministry, which, as described above, may also
be tainted by intimidation or abuse. 12 6 For example, according
to Mr. Alfonso Martfn del Campo Dodd, agents of the judicial
police at the Mexico City Attorney General's office tortured him
123. The Inter-American Commission explains the purpose underlying procedural
immediacy as "avoid[ing] as much as possible any distancing of the judge from the
elements of the proceeding and especially from the accused." IACHR Report, supra note 21,
para. 313 (emphasis added).
124. See Alicia Ely Yamin & Pilar Noriega Garcfa, The Absence of Rule of Law in Mex-
ico: Diagnosis and Implications for a Mexican Transition to Democracy, 21 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 467, 499 (July 1999); Interview with Guillermo Eduardo Gonzdlez Medina,
Assistant Secretary to the Attorney General, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 1, 2000) ("The
first declaration has greater force in our system."). "The second declaration can revoke
the first, but [the defendant] has to prove torture." Id.
125. MEX. CONST. art. 20.
126. See supra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
HUMAN RIGHTS IN MEXICO
by placing a plastic bag over his head and beating him.1 27 As a
result of the torture, he signed a written statement confessing
that he killed his brother-in-law and his sister and then staged his
own kidnapping.1 2  When the defendant made his declaration
before the judge, he stated that he had been tortured and had
signed a false confession under coercion. 129 He was nevertheless
convicted. Crediting the first statement, the court placed the
burden on the defendant to prove that the confession was false
and had been obtained through torture. 3 ° The appellate court
granted full validity to the confession and sustained the convic-
tion."'
The defendants in the Yanga case were also tortured during
the preliminary investigation stage while in the custody of the
policy and Public Ministry, 13 2 and eventually signed confessions
before the Public Ministry. 13 1 In their first declarations before
the judge, in fact, before the judge's secretary, and in subse-
quent declarations, the defendants withdrew their Public Minis-
try confessions, claiming that they had signed them as a result of
torture.1 34 No investigation was undertaken at any point during
the proceedings in response to the defendant's allegations of
torture. The trial court considered the initial confessions valid
and stated that the withdrawal of the confessions was simply an
effort to avoid criminal responsibility.
135
A third problem, which reinforces the doctrine of procedu-
ral immediacy, is the marked skepticism with which allegations
of torture are met. In interviews with prosecutors and judges,
127. See Interview with Martin Alfonso del Campo Dodd, defendant, Pachuca
Prison, in Hidalgo, Mex. (June 3, 2000).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Decision of the Eighth Chamber of the Superior Court ofJustice for Mex-
ico City, Mex. Aug. 17, 1993, at 65.
131. See id.
132. See Interview with Alvaro Castillo, defendant, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 3,
2000) (reporting that the police "hit me on the back of my neck, my stomach, they
burnt my arms and legs with cigarettes"). "They brought mineral water and forced it up
my nose while covering my mouth .... They dumped water on me .... They then
brought electric cables which they used to shock me in the legs and back." Id.
133. See id. (recounting that "[w]e had pages and pages they made us sign, and
those were what the Public Ministry used").
134. See id.
135. See Decision of the Sixth District Court for Criminal Matters in Mexico City,
Mex. (Aug. 20, 1996).
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the delegation encountered a widespread belief that defendants
routinely fabricate allegations of torture and coercion, often at
the suggestion of their lawyers. According to federal judge Mu-
rillo Chdtvez, "[u] nfortunately, torture is a form of defense peo-
ple utilize. They always allege that people have been tor-
tured. '136 Federal Judge Gonzalo Jestis de Morales Avila stated
simply, "l[t] hey always say they were hit. '137 Linking this general
skepticism to the policy underlying procedural immediacy, Rafl
Aguilar Maraboto, President of the Superior Tribunal of Justice
in Xalapa, explained, "we pay attention to the first statement be-
cause it is fresher. The defense lawyers tell them to say they were
hit."1 38
An obvious tension exists between these claims that torture
is routinely invoked as a means of avoiding criminal responsibil-
ity and the claims of many of the same judges that cases of tor-
ture are rare. In fact, it seems that allegations of torture are rela-
tively common; however, they are not often credited by judges
and, even less frequently, investigated by prosecutors. The fail-
ure to take seriously allegations of torture is itself a violation of
Mexico's obligations under international law.1 39 In addition,
this judicial skepticism regarding claims of torture undermines
the effectiveness of the judiciary in excluding evidence tainted
by coercion.
A fourth obstacle to the effectiveness of judicial oversight as
a means of ensuring the voluntariness of confessions is the ab-
senteejudge. Notwithstanding the guarantee of Article 20 of the
136. Interview with Murillo ChAvez, Federal Judge, in Guerrero, Mex. (June 5,
2000)
137. Interview with Gonzalo Jesdis de Morales Avila, Judge, First District Court, in
Oaxaca, Mex. (June 2, 2000).
138. Interview with Rafil Aguilar Maraboto, President of the Superior Tribunal of
Justice in Xalapa, in Mexico City, Mex, (June 2, 2000). This attitude not only under-
mines the role of a judge in ensuring the integrity of the criminal process but also
serves as a justification for the restrictions on access to counsel. For example, a prose-
cutor in Veracruz testified that as a practice, his office does not permit access to counsel
because, "if we did permit it, they would counsel them and the declaration would be
worked up." Interview with Ernest Fernando, prosecutor, in Veracruz, Mex. Uune 1,
2000). This perception of lawyers as tainting the judicial process not only undermines
the role of the lawyers in protecting the rights of the detainee/defendant but also con-
tributes to hostility toward and intimidation of the lawyers themselves.
139. See Convention Against Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment of Punishment, arts. 2, 4, G.A. Res. 39146, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
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Mexican Constitution, 14 it is a common practice for the judge's
secretary rather than the judge himself to hear the declaration
of the defendant.141 Indeed, Mr. Solom6n Sebastian Her-
ndndez, an indigenous Zapotec who had been held in preventive
detention in Oaxaca for almost three years at the time of the
interview, told the delegation that he had never seen the judge
presiding in his case despite the fact that he was at the final
stages of the judicial process. 142 Following Mr. Sebastian Her-
ndndez's hearing, members of the delegation located the presid-
ing state court judge, Mr. Roberto Diego L6pez Hermindez, in
an office adjacent to the hearing room. The judge explained
that it is standard practice to rely on the written record rather
than to hear the testimony directly. He commented, "I wonder
when you say to be present there ... do you mean that I should
be there to intervene in the process? I'm not there to intervene
in the process, nothing is going to change by my presence.
This case is not unique. Criminal defense lawyers and
human rights advocates reported to the delegation that judges'
secretaries often oversee the cases while judges appear only on
rare occasions.144 According to Barbara Zamora, "[i] n a normal
proceeding, a person should declare verbally, in front of the
judge. If [the declaration] is written, it is supposed to be ratified
verbally in front of the judge."145 Pilar Noriega adds that "[t]he
problem is that lawyers have become accustomed to this and
have accepted it. When we lawyers demand the presence of a
judge, it's perceived to be an aggressive attitude, even though
we're just demanding our clients' rights."146
140. MEX. CONST. art. 20. (guaranteeing that a criminal defendant "will be tried in
public audience by a judge").
141. This practice was widely confirmed by defense lawyers and acknowledged by
judges themselves. See, e.g., Interview with Bdrbara Zamora, attorney, in Mexico City,
Mex. (May 30, 2000); Interview with Amado Chinas Fuentes, federal court judge, in
Oaxaca, Mex. (June 2, 2000) (stating that "[o]ur system is eminently written, but our
law makes it possible for the judge to be there").
142. See Interview with Solom6n Sebastfan Herndndez, defendant, in Oaxaca, Mex.
(May 30, 2000).
143. Interview with Roberto Diego L6pez Hernndez, state court judge, in Oaxaca,
Mex. (May 30, 2000).
144. See, e.g., Interview with J. Antonio Aguilar Valdez, First Visitor, Mexico City
Human Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000).
145. Interview with Bdrbara Zamora, attorney, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 30,
2000).
146. Interview with Digna Ochoa and Pilar Noriega, defense attorneys, in Mexico
City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
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In short, despite efforts to eliminate statements taken by the
judicial police and otherwise curtail the role of confessions in
the criminal justice system, the use of confessions or witness
statements taken under coercive conditions continues to be a se-
rious problem. As Digna Ochoa, a prominent defense attorney,
stated, "The problem is that once a person is tortured and signs
a confession, the judge gives full value to the declaration, and
when the person withdraws it in front of ajudge, the judge does
not credit it."147 Judge Murillo Chdtvez explained the reasoning
in this way:
In these cases, the presumption is that the authorities are act-
ing in accordance with the law. When they don't, this must
be demonstrated. When the defendant retracts the confes-
sion, he needs to show the cause of the retraction- [that is,]
show evidence that he was tortured. This is because so many
people systematically allege being tortured in order to avoid
being tried. So a person has the right to retract the confes-
sion and show the reason. 148
In short, a declaration made by the detainee while under the
control of the Public Ministry and judicial police and without
meaningful access to counsel enjoys a presumption of validity.
The burden of proof is then on the detainee to show why the
statement should be disregarded. Unfortunately, as the next
subsection demonstrates, this burden is nearly an impossible one
for the defendant to prove.
3. Defendant's Burden to Prove Torture
As noted above, under Mexican law, a confession that is
given under the threat of torture may not be relied upon in a
criminal proceeding. 149 As a practical matter, however, having
such a confession excluded is extremely difficult. The difficulty
stems from both the definition of torture applied by judges and
the method of proof.
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
mane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which Mexico
147. Interview with Digna Ochoa, attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (May
29, 2000).
148. Interview with Maclovio Murillo Chtvez, federal court judge, in Guererro,
Mex. (June 5, 2000).
149. See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion of co-
erced confession under Mexican law).
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has ratified, defines torture to include "any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally in-
flicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed."15 Article 3 of the Federal Law to Prevent Torture
defines torture as the infliction of "grave physical or psychologi-
cal pain or suffering on a person for the purpose of obtaining
... information or a confession or of punishing the person for
an act that he or she may have committed or is suspected of
having committed. '151 Thus, both international and domestic
laws prohibit both physical and psychological torture, whether
for the purpose of obtaining information or for punishment.
The efficacy of this statutory prohibition on torture de-
pends, to a large extent, on judicial practice in that it is judges
who determine whether sufficient evidence of torture exists.
Unfortunately, many Mexican officials interviewed by the delega-
tion described a much narrower standard for what constitutes
torture than that prescribed in international law or the federal
statute. According to many prosecutors and judges, torture is
limited to physical abuse that leaves lesions; physical abuse that
does not result in lasting lesions is considered mistreatment, a
lesser crime. As Bertharuth Areola Ruiz, the assistant attorney
general for proceedings in Oaxaca explained, "[a]buse of au-
thority includes beatings that don't arrive at the point of lesions.
Up to the point of lesions, this is a different crime, but not tor-
ture. ' 152 Judge Gonzalo Jesds de Morales Avila acknowledged
that "[o]ften, when they torture, they do not leave lesions," but
added that "if the medical certification declares that there are
no signs of torture, the law is very clear that there is no tor-
ture."155
This definition of torture is problematic for several reasons.
First, the presence of visible lesions has no necessary relationship
to the severity of physical abuse. Rather, the definition simply
150. Convention Against Torture art. 1 (1).
151. Federal Law to Prevent Torture.
152. See Interview with Bertharuth Areola Ruiz, Assistant Attorney General for Pro-
ceedings, in Oaxaca, Mex. (June 2, 2000).
153. See Interview with Gonzalo Jesdis de Morales Avila, Judge, First District Court,
in Oaxaca, Mex. (June 2, 2000); see also Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of
Criminal Procedure, supra note 39, at 24.
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places a premium on torture techniques the effects of which are
either invisible or disappear quickly. Second, it creates an incen-
tive for prolonged detention by the judicial police or Public Min-
istry to allow any visible lesions to heal and disappear. Third, it
means that psychological torture is virtually impossible to prove.
Many judges acknowledged that psychological torture might oc-
cur; however, they noted that, as it cannot be corroborated with
physical evidence, they generally do not credit such allega-
tions.'54 One federal judge went so far as to say that "only God
would know" whether or not psychological torture had oc-
curred. 1 5 5
Another way in which the definition of torture applied by
judges apparently departs from the definition under interna-
tional and domestic law concerns the purpose of the abuse. Al-
though both international and domestic laws define torture ex-
pressly to encompass severe mistreatment intended as punish-
ment, 156 many judges and prosecutors expressed the view that
torture is limited to abuse intended to elicit information from
victims. 157 This narrow definition, coupled with the per se exclu-
sion of statements taken by the judicial police, 158 leads many
judges to the conclusion that, notwithstanding the claims of de-
tainees, torture rarely occurs: why would police inflict physical
abuse to extract testimony when that testimony is inadmissible?
Both the burden and method of proving torture further
compound the problem of this narrow definition. Although the
Mexican procedural codes do not specify the burden of proof
when a defendant alleges torture,judges have placed the burden
on the defendant to prove that torture occurred rather than on
the prosecutor to establish the voluntariness of the contested
declaration. As one judge explained, "In these cases, the pre-
154. See Interview with Gonzalo Jesfs de Morales Avila, Judge, First District Court,
in Oaxaca, Mex. (June 2, 2000) (noting that "it is practically impossible to prove psycho-
logical torture").
155. Interview with Maclovio Murillo ChAvez, federal court judge, in Guererro,
Mex. (June 5, 2000).
156. See Convention Against Torture art. 1 (1); Federal Law to Prevent Torture art.
3.
157. See, e.g., Interview with Maclovio Murillo Chdvez, federal courtjudge, in Guer-
erro, Mex. (June 5, 2000) (noting that "the accused needs to show a causal link between
the wounds and the outcome, because in some cases, people self-inflict wounds").
158. See supra notes 94-96 (discussing domestic law prohibiting use of confessions
rendered to judicial police).
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sumption is that the authorities are acting in accordance with
the law. When they don't, this must be demonstrated. ' 15 9 Mexi-
can officials regard the 1993 reforms as having addressed the
problem of the burden of proof by requiring the public prosecu-
tor to show that the statement was taken before the Public Minis-
try and in the presence of defense counsel or a person of confi-
dence. But, for the reasons explained above and in Part III, such
safeguards do not adequately ensure the voluntariness of the
statement. In practice, the defendant's signature on a confes-
sion and the ratification of the confession by a defense attorney
or person of confidence sets up a strong presumption in favor of
its validity. Under the principle of procedural immediacy the
defendant's earliest statement is granted even more weight.
160
The defendant must overcome the weight of these presumptions
in order to have a confession excluded.
The method by which a defendant must prove torture fur-
ther adds to the difficulty. When asked about proof of torture,
many judges emphasized that the defendant cannot rely solely
on his or her testimony. As Judge Amado Chifias Fuentes ex-
plained, "[t]here is a principle that no one can prove something
with words alone. You must have evidence to corroborate what
occurred. It is never the case that someone could prove torture
by the statement itself."161 Yet, the defendant may have little or
no access to corroborating evidence, particularly evidence from
official sources. For example, Article 7 of the Federal Law to
Prevent Torture provides that "any detainee or accused person
shall, immediately upon request, be examined by a forensic med-
ical expert, and if none is available, or if the detainee requests it
in addition, by a doctor of his or her choice.' 6 2 The court, how-
ever, may discount a report submitted by a defendant from a
private doctor, regarding it as biased, and require instead a med-
ical certificate from an official doctor substantiating the torture
allegations.'63 Yet, such an official report, if it exists, may not be
159. See Interview with Maclovio Murillo Chdvez, federal court judge, in Guerrero,
Mex. (june 5, 2000).
160. See supra notes 123-34 (discussing the principle of procedural immediacy).
161. Interview with Amado Chifias Fuentes, federal court judge, in Oaxaca, Mex.
(June 2, 2000).
162. See Federal Law to Prevent Torture art. 7.
163. See Interview with Gonzalo Jesis de Morales Avila, Judge, First District Court,
in Oaxaca, Mex. (June 2, 2000).
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available to the defendant. Article 56 of the Organic Law for the
Public Ministry's office in the Federal District established the
power of the Public Ministry to provide copies of such reports
but not the obligation to do SO, 1 64 Apparently, the Public Minis-
try has interpreted this as a discretionary power, placing the de-
fense at the mercy of the prosecution, even regarding proof of
allegations of torture by the Public Ministry itself or the judicial
police under its supervision. 165
Limiting medical evidence to the report of an official doctor
is also problematic due to the lack of independence of such doc-
tors. An obvious conflict of interest arises between the doctor's
role as a civil servant with a professional relationship to the Pub-
lic Ministry and his or her duty to evaluate and report objectively
on the condition of the detainee. Although doctors do some-
times note signs of torture in their evaluations, 166 the delegation
heard many accounts of doctors not only ignoring physical abuse
but also acting affirmatively to cover up the torture. For exam-
ple, Alvaro Sebastian Ramirez, a defendant detained in Etla
Prison, reported to the delegation that "[t]he doctor showed up
not to treat me but to cover up evidence of torture before [I was
sent] to the Public Ministry. Another doctor looked at me later,
but didn't even touch me. I told her I had been tortured, but
she just signed off on the papers." '167
Poor funding and training of forensic doctors only com-
pounds the problem with medical evidence. Often detainees
lack access to any physician in a timely manner. Delay in medi-
cal examinations can mean not only the denial of needed medi-
164. See Reglamento de la Ley Orgfanica de la Procuradurfa General dejusticia del
Distrito Federal [Regulations of the Organic Law on the Office of the Attorney General
for Mexico City], art. 56, cited in Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Crimi-
nal Procedure, supra note 39, at 24 n.112.
165. See Interview with Mauricio Barrera, defense attorney, in Mexico City, Mex.
(May 30, 2000) (noting that "[w]e have a right to ask for a copy of documents during
the investigation, but the Public Ministry rarely gives them because it is too much
work"); Interview with Enrique Aranda Ochoa, North Prison, in Mexico City, Mex.
(June 2, 2000) (stating that "(t]he psychological report also says that we had symptoms
of post-traumatic stress stemming from torture. But to this date, although they let us
read these reports, they would not let us have copies .... ").
166. See, e.g., Interview with Mauricio Barrera, defense attorney, in Mexico City,
Mex. (May 30, 2000).
167. Interview with Alvaro Sebastian Ramirez, defendant, Etla Prison, in Oaxaca,
Mex. (June 1, 2000).
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cal treatment but also the loss of critical physical evidence of tor-
ture.
Even assuming that the defendant can establish that physi-
cal abuse occurred, he must further prove that the torture was
meant to compel the confession. In other words, he must estab-
lish the state of mind of the torturer. The fact of physical abuse
coupled with an inculpatory declaration and a retraction by the
defendant is not enough to support a conclusion of torture.
Rather, it is generally accepted among judges, prosecutors, and
even government human rights officials that law enforcement of-
ficers may physically harm defendants, but that the motivation is
punishment, not obtaining a confession. Yet, it would be ex-
ceedingly rare for a defendant to be able to offer any direct evi-
dence of the perpetrator's intent short of the defendant's own
testimony, which is typically viewed quite skeptically.
Given the narrow definition of torture applied by the courts
and the heavy burden of proof imposed on defendants, it is not
surprising that evidence is rarely excluded on this basis. The
practical result of this failure to exclude tainted confessions is to
undermine any incentive to eliminate such abusive practices by
the police and the Public Ministry. In short, the statutory prohi-
bition on torture in the Federal Law to Prevent Torture cannot
succeed in eliminating the practice without substantial changes
in criminal procedure in cases where allegations of torture are
raised. This link between the substantive law on torture and
criminal procedure led the Human Rights Committee to express
its concern "that the possibility exists of placing on the accused
person the burden of proof that the confession has been ob-
tained by coercion." '168 The Human Rights Committee specifi-
cally recommended that Mexico "amend the provisions of the
law as necessary to ensure that the burden of proof that a confes-
sion used in evidence has been made by the accused person of
his own free will shall lie with the State."169
D. Recommendations
* Establish a system of inspection and monitoring of all
places of detention under control of the judicial police
168. See Concluding Observations of Human Rights Committee: Mexico, supra note 89,
para. 7.
169. Id.
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and Public Ministry, including the videotaping of interro-
gations.
* Once a detainee is presented to the Public Ministry, he
should not be returned to the custody of the Judicial Po-
lice.
* Statements made by detainees prior to presentation
before a judge, including statements made before the
Public Ministry, should have no probative value, whether
or not they are made in the presence of defense counsel
or a person of confidence.
* Judges should preside in person over any hearing con-
cerning the testimony of the accused, particularly when
allegations of torture have been raised.
" When a detainee has made a credible allegation of tor-
ture, the Public Ministry should immediately open an in-
vestigation. This investigation should, in turn, be coordi-
nated with the criminal proceedings against the accused
to ensure that any evidence of mistreatment of the de-
tainee will be available to the court and to the detainee
for use in his defense.
* The prosecutor and judge should not necessarily treat the
absence of physical evidence that would be consistent
with allegations of torture as proof that such allegations
are false.
* Access to independent forensic experts should be ex-
panded, as should the funding and training of such ex-
perts.
* The burden of proving the validity and voluntariness of a
confession should be placed on the State, the party seek-
ing to rely on the evidence at trial.
III. LEGAL DEFENSE
A. Introduction
The requirement of "effective legal assistance" v1 70 is nowhere
more important than in systems, such as Mexico's, that fail to
accord the full measure of criminal justice rights in the ways doc-
170. Basic Principles on the Role of Lauyers, art. 6, 21, 8th Cong., at 118, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Principles on Lauyers].
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umented in Parts II and III.171 This part considers the ways in
which the Mexican criminal justice system fails to meet this
need.
This section begins with a survey of Mexico's international
and domestic legal obligations to ensure that persons have ade-
quate legal representation. It then considers the extent to which
current practice fails to meet these obligations in several critical
areas. First, this section documents the systematic denial of
meaningful access to legal counsel, especially during the critical
early stages of criminal investigations. Next, it considers Mex-
ico's failure to provide adequate legal representation to persons
who cannot afford it. Finally, this section concludes with an ex-
amination of Mexico's guarantee that persons may choose to be
represented by non-lawyer "persons of confidence," an option
that in theory seeks to augment legal representation but in prac-
tice is used as a way of defeating it.
B. Mexico's Human Rights Obligations
1. International Obligations
Several international instruments to which Mexico is a party
establish the right to counsel. The American Convention pro-
vides that every person accused of a criminal offense is entitled,
at a minimum, to adequate counsel and to private communica-
tion with the lawyer. 17 2 The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights ("Inter-American Court"),173 in an advisory opinion, fur-
ther stated that the American Convention could be violated "if it
can be proved that the lack of legal counsel affected the right to
171. See Martin Flaherty, Human Rights Violations Against Defense Lawyers: The Case of
Northern Ireland, 7 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 87, 88, 97 (1994).
172. American Convention art. 8(2). The American Convention provides that the
accused is entitled to:
[Aldequate time and means for the preparation of his defense; the right of
the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of
his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with counsel; the
inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state, paid or not as
the domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally
or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law; the right
of the defense to examine witnesses present in the court and to obtain the
appearance, as witnesses, of experts or other persons who may throw light on
the facts ....
Id.
173. Mexico officially accepted, the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights in December 1998.
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a fair hearing."'17 4 The Inter-American Commission, moreover,
has made clear that the right to counsel attaches upon arrest
rather than the filing of formal criminal charges. As the Com-
mission recently declared, Mexico should "guarantee the right
of those arrested to communicate immediately with an attorney of
their choice. 1
75
The ICCPR likewise guarantees a broadly defined right to
effective counsel. In particular, Article 14 provides that in the
determination of any criminal charge against a person, the ac-
cused shall be entitled to adequate defense and to communicate
with counsel of his or her own choosing.176 Like the American
Convention, the ICCPR provides the accused with the right to
examine witnesses against him or her, as well as to obtain wit-
nesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as wit-
nesses against the accused. 177
The Human Rights Committee has amplified several aspects
of the right to effective representation. In interpreting Article
14 of the ICCPR in the various individual petitions brought
before it, the Human Rights Committee stated that the right of a
defendant to have adequate time and facilities for the prepara-
tion of his or her defense is "an important element of the guar-
antee of a fair trial" and a "corollary of the principle of equality
of arms" between the prosecution and the defense.'77 The
Human Rights Committee also noted that once counsel is as-
174. Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ser. A, No. 11, 27 (1990), re-
printed in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 108-09 (Thomas Buergenthal &
Dinah Shelton eds., 4th ed. 1995).
175. IACHR Report, supra note 21, para. 721 (emphasis added).
176. See ICCPR art. 14(3). The ICCPR provides that the accused shall be entitled
to:
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to commu-
nicate with counsel of his own choosing; ... [t]o be tried in his presence, and
to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to
be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have
legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so
require, and without payment by him in any 'such case if he does not have
sufficient means to pay for it; [t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him ....
Id.
177. Id. art. 14(3)(e).
178. Little v.Jamaica, Hum. Rts. Comm. Decisions, 43rd Sess., para. 8.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988 (1991), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/un-
docs/html/dec283.htm.
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signed to the accused, measures must be taken to ensure that the
lawyer provides effective representation in the interests of jus-
tice. 179 Moreover, the Human Rights Committee further stated
that when the complainant was unable to obtain the testimony of
a witness on his or her behalf under the same conditions as testi-
mony of witnesses against the complainant, the ICCPR provision
was violated. 80
The right to effective legal counsel receives further protec-
tion and definition from the United Nations Basic Principles on
the Role of Lawyers ("Basic Principles on Lawyers").181 Ap-
proved by the General Assembly in 1990, the Basic Principles on
Lawyers constitute the international community's authoritative
statement on matters relating to legal representation. As such,
they form an important part of the growing body of customary
international law protecting fundamental human rights. Ac-
cording to the Basic Principles on Lawyers, "[a]ll persons are
entitled to call upon the assistance of a lawyer of their choice to
protect and establish their rights and to defend them in all
stages of criminal proceedings. 1 1 2 They also state that govern-
ments "shall ensure that all persons [be] immediately informed
by the competent authority of their right to be assisted by a law-
yer of their own choice upon arrestor detention."'8 3 The Basic
Principles on Lawyers further provide the accused with the right
to have a "lawyer of experience and competence commensurate
with the nature of the offence assigned to them in order to pro-
vide effective legal assistance, without payment by them if they
lack sufficient means to pay for such services."'81 4 As for the tim-
ing of access to counsel, they state that governments shall ensure
that "all persons arrested or detained, with or without criminal
charge, shall have prompt access to a lawyer, and in any case not
later than forty-eight hours from the time of arrest or deten-
tion. 185 Moreover, the Basic Principles on Lawyers provide the
accused with "adequate opportunities, time and facilities to be
179. See Steadman v. Jamaica, Hum. Rts. Comm. Views, 59th Sess., para. 10.3, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/528/1993 (1997), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
undocs/html/VWS528.htm.
180. See Little, para. 8.4.
181. Basic Principles on Lauyers, supra note 170.
182. Id. art. 1.
183. Id. art. 5.
184. Id. art. 6.
185. Id. art. 7 (emphasis added).
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visited by and to communicate and consult with a lawyer, without
delay ... and in full confidentiality."186
2. Domestic Obligations
In 1993, reforms of the Mexican Constitution for the first
time established a criminal suspect's right to a defense counsel,
including a public defender, during the prior investigation
phase of the criminal process. 187 This prior investigation stage
runs from the Public Ministry's initiation of an investigation
through the stage in which the Public Ministry brings formal
charges against the suspect before a judge. Article 20, § IX of
the Constitution now provides that the suspect "will from the be-
ginning of the process... have the right to an adequate defense,
through self-representation, the representation of an attorney or
of a person of his confidence. If he does not wish to name a
representative or cannot do so .. .the judge will assign him a
public defender."1 88
Numerous officials, scholars, and lawyers with whom we met
interpret the process as the moment of detention. On this read-
ing, the Constitution clearly grants the accused with the right to
counsel from the time the defendant is detained."8 Others,
however, interpret Article 20 as giving the defendant the right to
counsel only upon making a formal declaration before the Pub-
lic Ministry."9
186. Id. art. 8.
187. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 12.
188. MEX. CONST. art. 20 (IX) (emphasis added).
189. See, e.g., Interview with Dr. Luis de la Barreda Solorzano, President, Mexico
City Human Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 31, 2000) (stating that
"[t]he Constitution and the law are very clear that from the moment of detention the
detainee has the right to consult"); Interview with Margarita Herrera Ortiz, President,
Veracruz Human Rights Commission, in Veracruz, Mex. (May 31, 2000) (stating that
"t]he very moment a person is arrested, he has the right to ask for an attorney. If we
deny a person that right, we are violating the law."); Interview with Miguel Sarre, Profes-
sor of Law, Autonomous Technical Institute of Mexico, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29,
2000) (asserting that "[flormally'speaking, access to counsel starts at the moment of
detention").
190. See, e.g., Interview with Gonzalo Jesdis de Morales Avila, Judge, First District
Court, in Oaxaca, Mex. (June 2, 2000) (stating that "the defendant does have the right
to a defender, but not until he makes a declaration"); Interview with Jost Dtvalos, Di-
rector General, Training Institute of the Federal Attorney General's Office, in Mexico
City, Mex. (May 31, 2000) (stating that there is only one interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, which is the right to counsel at the moment of declaration); Interview with Augus-
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To the extent that contested provisions of domestic law
should be interpreted in a manner with international standards,
it would appear that the plain meaning of Article 20 should pre-
vail and that the right to counsel should arise upon arrest.19
But whatever the proper interpretation, actual practice renders
the debate moot. As the next section will document, detainees
throughout Mexico are routinely denied access to counsel dur-
ing the initial investigation, even though they remain in deten-
tion and subject to interrogation by the Judicial Police. Instead,
access to counsel is ordinarily granted only when the accused
makes his or her first formal declaration before the Public Minis-
try.
Specific criminal law provisions facilitate current practice.
A number of observers told our delegation that this phenome-
non reflects a more general pattern in which particular criminal
law provisions undermine constitutional reforms intended to
better secure fundamental rights.192 In this instance, both state
and federal codes of criminal procedure acknowledge the princi-
ple that the accused has the right to counsel during the initial
investigation, but adopt the narrow definition of this right as at-
taching only upon the detainee's declaration before the Public
Ministry. The FCCP, for example, provides that the accused
shall be advised of his or her right to counsel immediately upon
detention, as well as of his or her right to be assigned a public
defender if he or she does not chose an attorney.19 3 The FCCP
further states, however, that the accused has the right to legal
representation "to declare."'9 4 Other FCCP provisions, moreo-
ver, state only that counsel be present during formal evidentiary
proceedings during the prior investigation stage rather than
tin Gonzdlez, Judicial Police Attorney, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 7, 2000) (stating that
"[w]hen the Public Ministry takes a declaration, the accused has the right to access to
counsel").
191. Basic Principles on Lauyers, supra note 170, art. 5. Cf Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (holding that ambiguous United
States laws should be interpreted in the manner that is most consistent with interna-
tional law).
192. See, e.g., Interview with Santiago Corcuera, Professor of Law, in Mexico City,
Mex. (May 29, 2000) (asserting that "[t]he question is whether the legal framework not
only allows, but promotes illegal detention ... [the] change in procedural law regard-
ing enflagrancia ... is an element which is facilitating arbitrary detention").
193. See FCCP art. 128(111) (b).
194. See id. art. 128(III) (a).
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from the moment of arrest.'95 In similar fashion, the MCCCP
provides that a suspect will be able to designate a legal represen-
tative during the prior investigation stage,19 6 yet states that the
right to actual assistance arises "when he declares" before the
Public Ministry. 97 Further language suggests that a legal repre-
sentative be present during the prior investigation only during
formal evidentiary proceedings. 98 In these ways, both state and
federal codes effectively support the current practice denying
detainees access to counsel during interrogation by the police
during the prior investigation stage. 99
C. Access to Counsel in Practice
Both defense lawyers and government officials made clear
to our delegation that the standard practice in Mexico is to deny
access to counsel until a detainee first makes his or her declara-
tion before the Public Ministry, and even then, to deny commu-
nication between the two at least until after the declaration is
made. Among other things, this practice violates international
standards guaranteeing prompt access, the ability to prepare a
defense, and in numerous instances, to select a lawyer of one's
own choosing. These violations occur, moreover, during the
very period in which the authorities pressure the accused to give
statements that, under the doctrine of procedural immediacy,
are given the most weight at trial. 20 0 Access to lawyers is denied,
in short, where it is needed most.
The Crowley Mission failed to encounter a single case in
which a detainee had access to counsel prior to the first declara-
tion or even which, once there, the lawyer could speak with the
detainee until after the declaration was made. Typical is the case
of Roberto Nagera, a Mexico City street vendor charged with as-
sault. According to his legal representative, Mr. Nagera was not
195. See id.
196. See, e.g., MCCCP art. 134 (providing that suspects will be able to name a law-
yer or person of confidence to represent them "beginning in the prior investigation
stage"). The MCCCP also states that a public defender must be assigned if the suspect
fails to name a defense representative. Moreover, it provides for the right of the ac-
cused to communicate with whomever she or he wishes from the place of detention in
the Public Ministry. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. art. 269.
199. See id. arts. 269, 431.
200. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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permitted to see a lawyer or person of confidence until his first
formal declaration took place before the prosecutor's secre-
tary. 20 1 Nor, moreover, was Mr. Nagera at any point permitted to
speak with his person of confidence even though she was present
during the declaration. 2  Mr. Nagera's counsel further told our
delegation that, although she wanted to advise her client during
the proceedings, she remained silent out of fear that the prose-
cutor's secretary would indicate in the file that she was con-
ducting his declaration and replace her with a public defender
who would provide no meaningful legal assistance.20 3 Similarly,
Manuel Galicia, charged with robbery and possession of a
weapon, was denied access to counsel until the formal declara-
tion commenced. 4 Even then, Mr. Galicia could not communi-
cate with his attorney during the proceedings. Instead, the law-
yer was merely permitted to be present in the room, and only
could talk to him after his declaration was made. 20 5
In several instances the denial of access was even more
troubling. In the case of Alfonso Del Campo Dodd,20 6 the ac-
cused had no access to legal representation until the declara-
tion,20 7 even though the accused was charged and later con-
victed of a double murder. According to the defendant, moreo-
ver, the police had earlier conducted a lengthy interrogation
before he had any benefit of legal advice. In Oaxaca, Andr~s
Enrique Herndndez was likewise prohibited from seeing a lawyer
before he made his declaration. Once again, the lawyer, a public
defender, was present during the proceeding, but was not per-
mitted to talk with Mr. Herndndez.2 1° In this case, however, Mr.
201. Interview with Ana Lorena Delgadillo Perez ("Ana Lorena Delgadillo"), law
student and person of confidence, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 30, 2000); see also Inter-
view with Alvaro Castillo, defendant, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 3, 2000) (stating that
"[w]e didn't even see the [public defender] until we went to declare and the secretary
said this is your lawyer").
202. Interview with Ana Lorena Delgadillo, law student and person of confidence,
in Mexico City, Mex. (May 30, 2000).
203. Id.
204. Interview with Mauricio Barrera, law student, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 30,
2000).
205. Id.
206. Criminal File No. 57/92, Mexico City.
207. Interview with Alfonso Del Campo Dodd, defendant, Pachuca Prison, in Hi-
dalgo, Mex. (June 3, 2000).
208. Interview with Andr~s Enrique Herndndez, defendant, Etla Prison, in Oaxaca,
Mex. (June 1, 2000); see also Interview with Octaviano Herndndez Pacheco, defendant,
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Herndndez did not even know his name, even though the attor-
ney signed the court papers at the proceeding. 20 9
In a number of cases, lawyers show up late or not at all. For
example, Adalberto Jorge Pacheco Santiago, 210 a defendant in
the Loxicha case, stated that his public defender did not arrive
until twenty minutes into his declaration. 1 In the Cacalomacan
case, 2 12 Gonzalo Sanchez Navarrete made his declaration with-
out the presence of an attorney. 13 In fact, Mr. Navarrete stated
that he declared "about four times without a lawyer. ''214 Simi-
larly, in the case involving Eduardo Torres and thirty-four indig-
enous rights members from the organization Centro de Apoyo al
Movimiento Popular Oaxaquefio ("CAMPO") in Oaxaca, the
declarations were also taken without the presence of a lawyer.2 5
Nevertheless, in many of the cases, the court secretary still wrote
"that the public defender [was] there," even though "the public
defender [was] not there. 2 1 6
Lawyers throughout Mexico indicated that these cases re-
flected the norm. As one attorney summarized the situation:
"[iln a practical sense, for the judge to believe [that] the consti-
tutional guarantee of counsel has been satisfied, the defender
must only be there and sign the papers. The judge doesn't look
to whether any real counsel was offered, just whether the de-
fender was there. 2 17 As noted, many judges and secretaries ap-
parently do not even care whether the lawyer is physically pre-
sent so long as he or she signs the relevant papers. As a result,
some lawyers indicated that they generally prefer not to take part
Etla Prison, in Oaxaca, Mex. (June 1, 2000) (stating that the "public defender never
identified himself as such").
209. Id.
210. Criminal File No. 57/98, Oaxaca, Mex. The attorney in the case also testified
that he did not have any contact with the defendant before the declaration before the
Public Ministry.
211. Interview with AdalbertoJorge Pacheco Santiago, defendant, in Oaxaca, Mex.
(May 30, 2000).
212. Criminal File No. 30/95, Mexico City, Mex.
213. Interview with Gonzalo Sanchez Navarrete, defendant, in Mexico City, Mex.
(June 3, 2000).
214. Id.
215. Interview with Eduardo Torres, Gladis Ramfres, Cesar Morales, Members, In-
digenous Rights Group, in Oaxaca, Mex. (June 1, 2000).
216. Interview with J. Antonio Aguilar Valdez, First Visitor, Mexico City Human
Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000).
217. Interview with Israel Ochoa, defense attorney, in Oaxaca, Mex. (June 2,
2000).
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in declaration proceedings because the attorneys do not assist
the defendants, but only serve to legitimize the current judicial
process that undermines the rights of the accused. 1
Current practice in Mexico stands in stark contrast to ex-
press international guarantees. In particular, the wholesale de-
nial of legal representation until a detainee's formal declaration
is clearly inconsistent with the Inter-American Commission's
conclusion that the American Convention requires immediate
access to counsel,2 1 ' as well as with the right of prompt access to
a defense lawyer set out in the Basic Principles on Lawyers.
2 20
Because the accused may be held in detention for forty-eight to
ninety-six hours, the formal declaration may not take place until
after many hours or even days. 2 21 A detainee, therefore, has no
access to counsel during this entire period, even though she or
he is usually within the custody of the Judicial Police and subject
to repeated interrogation. 222
Likewise violating international standards is the peculiar
practice of preventing attorneys from speaking with clients even
though they are physically present. It is difficult to see how this
practice can be squared with the American Convention's provi-
sion that the accused have the right "to communicate freely and
privately with counsel ... in order to prepare a defense." 223 Nor
would this systematic practice pass muster any more easily under
the Basic Principles on Lawyers, which guarantee that the ac-
cused shall have adequate time and opportunity "to be visited by
and to communicate and consult with a lawyer. ' 224 That these
violations occur during the declaration before the Public Minis-
try, proceedings that are especially important in the Mexican
criminal justice system, make them even more egregious.
218. Interview with Pilar Noriega, defense attorney, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29,
2000) (stating that "[g] enerally, I prefer not to be present when declarations are taken,
because they just put down what they want to put down whether or not I am there").
219. See IACHR Report, supra note 21, para. 721.
220. See Basic Principles on Lawyers, supra note 170, art. 7.
221. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 14. This practice violates the Basic Principles on Lawyers, which calls on
governments to ensure all detainees with access to counsel, "and in any case not later
than forty-eight hours from the time of arrest or detention." See Basic Principles on Law-
yers, supra note 170, art. 7.
222. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 14.
223. American Convention art. 8(2).
224. Basic Principles on Lawyers, supra note 170, art. 8.
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International instruments do not merely provide detained
persons with a right to counsel, but with a right to counsel of
choice.2 2 5 While this right does not appear to be denied as con-
sistently as the rights of prompt access and communication, the
delegation nonetheless encountered a troubling pattern in
which the right to choose legal counsel was honored in the
breach. For example, Octaviano Herndndez Pacheco, after his
arrest, had requested his own private lawyer. He recounted the
scene at the courthouse as the following: "[t] he public defender
said, 'I will be your lawyer.' I said, 'I have a lawyer, Israel Ochoa.
Please give me an opportunity to call him.' But the proceeding
just continued with this public defender just sitting there. 226
Even though the lawyer should have presented witnesses on be-
half of the defendant, the public defender did not speak one
word to Mr. Pacheco. 2 7 Instead, the lawyer just signed the dec-
laration.228 Similarly, in a case involving students attending the
National Autonomous University of Mexico City, the arrested
students requested to have a private lawyer.229 They were in-
formed, however, that a public defender was already assigned to
their case. 23 0 Even though the students felt that the public de-
fender's representation was not adequate, they were not allowed
to have counsel of their choice.
D. Adequacy of Legal Defense
1. Public Defenders
Even without the types of state interference just described,
the vast majority of the Mexican population would nonetheless
face the problem of poor or inadequate legal representation.23 '
Approximately 80% of those individuals who find themselves fac-
ing the criminal justice system cannot afford private counsel and
225. See American Convention art. 8(2); ICCPR art. 14(3); Basic Principles on Law-
yers, supra note 170, art. 1.
226. Interview with Octaviano Herndndez Pacheco, defendant, Etla Prison, in Oax-
aca, Mex. (June 1, 2000).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Interview with Digna Ochoa, attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (May
29, 2000).
230. Id.
231. See generally Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Proce-
dure, supra note 39, at 16 (describing the public defender system in Mexico).
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consequently rely on public defenders.23 2 The work of public
defenders throughout Mexico suffers from numerous factors, in-
cluding heavy caseload, lack of training, and low salaries. In ad-
dition, public defenders do not enjoy sufficient autonomy from
prosecutors, especially at the state level. As Professor Santiago
Corcuera Canezut states, the net result is a system in which "our
jails are full of poor people, full of those who have no access to
counsel. The public defense system does not work in Mexico
because of lack of resources. That is probably one of the most
horrendous crimes that the State can commit.
233
The problems that plague the public defender system are
evident throughout the criminal justice process. According to
Antonio Aguilar Vald~z for example, in Mexico City thirty-three
public defenders are expected to handle the prior investigation
stage even though there are seventy-four different Public Minis-
try agencies. 23 '4 As a result, public defenders often find that they
have to attend several agencies at once, and thus cannot be pre-
sent at many of their clients' declaration proceedings. 35 Under-
staffing, moreover, remains a problem during the second stage,
once the case is before a judge. At this point, Mexico City pro-
vides fifty-four public defenders to cover the cases that appear
before 132 court secretaries.236 On average, each public de-
fender handles 100 to 150 cases, 237 and is assigned to three hear-
ings a day-any one of which may last from eight to twelve
hours.2 38 The situation appears even more bleak once it is kept
in mind that public defenders must not only attend hearings,
232. See Interview with Jesdis Zamora Pierce, President, Mexican Academy of Crimi-
nal Sciences, in Mexico City, Mex. (june 7, 2000); see also Lawyers Comm. for Human
Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra note 39, at 15.
233. Interview with Santiago Corcuera Canezut, Professor of Law, in Mexico City,
Mex. (May 29, 2000); see also Videotape: Joseph R. Crowley Program in Int'l Human
Rights (Fordham Law School 2000) (on file with the Crowley Program).
234. Interview with J. Antonio Aguilar Valdez, First Visitor, Mexico City Human
Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000).
235. Id.; see also Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Proce-
dure, supra note 39, at 16.
236. Id. For a more specific example, in the Penal Court of Peace, which deals
with minor offenses, 36 public defenders handle cases for the 80 secretaries. Id.
237. Interview with Juan Luis Gonzdlez, President, Mexico CityJudicial Council, in
Mexico City, Mex. (June 6, 2000).
238. See Interview with J. Antonio Aguilar Valdez, First Visitor, Mexico City Human
Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000).*
20011
850 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:801
but also are responsible for conducting investigations, drafting
documents, and making court appearances.
On top of all this, the salaries of public defenders are signifi-
cantly lower than that of prosecutors. 239 In consequence, the
Mexican criminal justice system does not approach even the
most rudimentary type of equality that should exist between de-
fense and prosecution. As Antonio Vald~z stated, "this process is
terrible. [Public defenders] are incapable of attending even
minimally in these cases. Thus, in practice, the defense is practi-
cally nonexistent. ' 24
°
Particularly at the state level, public defenders further lack
sufficient independence in both formal and practical terms. In
Mexico City, for example, the Office of the Public Defender
forms part of the executive branch of government and falls
under the jurisdiction of the General Department of Legal Ser-
vices of the Office of the Government Subsecretary for Legal Af-
fairs. 24' Even more troubling, in Oaxaca, the public defenders
are not only part of the executive branch of the government as
well, but also fall under the authority of the prosecutor's of-
fice.24 2 On both the federal and state level, moreover, public
defenders share physical facilities with members of the Public
Ministry. Federal defenders assigned to the prior investigation
phase of the criminal proceeding work in the Public Ministry
installations.243 In similar fashion, the law of the Mexico City
Office of the Public Defender states that the Public Ministry
must provide the public defenders with the required physical
239. See id.; Interview with Jestls Zamora Pierce, President, Mexican Academy of
Criminal Sciences, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 7, 2000). The salaries of the federal
defenders, however, are similar to those of federal prosecutors. See Interview with Csar
Esquinca Mufioz, Director General, Federal Public Defenders Institute, in Mexico City,
Mex. (June 6, 2000); see also Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal
Procedure, supra note 39, at 16.
240. See Interview withJ. Antonio Aguilar Valdez, First Visitor, Mexico City Human
Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000).
241. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 17. Recent improvements have been made, however, for defenders at the
Federal level. Currently, the Federal defenders form part of the judicial branch of gov-
ernment and are employed by the Federal Institute of Public Defenders, which is
viewed as an auxiliary body to the organ of the judicial branch, the Judicial Council. See
id. at 16.
242. Interview with Roberto Diego L6pez Hernindez, state court judge, 6th State
Penal Court, in Oaxaca, Mex. (May 30, 2000).
243. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 17 (citing Federal Public Defenders Law, Article 25).
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space.244 In the absence of their own facilities, defenders must
depend on the Public Ministry for necessary equipments and
materials, such as chairs, typing machines, and computers.245
Not only do public defenders and the Public Ministry prosecu-
tors, therefore, work in close proximity, the Public Ministry exer-
cises a considerable degree of control over the public defenders'
working conditions.
The potential for prosecutorial control becomes especially
pronounced in smaller jurisdictions. As one defense lawyer ex-
plained, the even greater proximity often means that public de-
fenders fail to represent their clients effectively because of an
"identity of interests" between the defender and prosecutor.24 6
Public defenders necessarily form close relationships with prose-
cutors with whom they must deal frequently, and therefore
"don't want to make it harder for themselves the next time" they
have to work with the prosecutors.247 In such an environment,
the quality of defense representation necessarily diminishes in
the face of the prosecutors' hostility to zealous defense advo-
cacy. 2 4
8
In these ways, current practice in Mexico again violates the
international standards. The American Convention, the ICCPR,
and the Basic Principles on Lawyers all provide the accused with
the right to adequate counsel. 249 The Basic Principles on Law-
yers further provide the defendant with the right to have a "law-
yer of experience and competence commensurate with the na-
ture of the offense."25 ° Moreover, the Human Rights Committee
interpreted the ICCPR provisions as embodying the "principle of
244. See id. (citing Mexico City Public Defenders Law, Article 25).
245. See Interview with J. Antonio Aguilar Valdez, First Visitor, Mexico City Human
Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000).
246. Interview with Digna Ochoa, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 3,
2000). Moreover, in some cases, the assigned public defenders were not independent
attorneys qualified to represent the defendants. For example, in the Ricardo Her-
nindez L6pez Case, the public defender testified that he worked for Prior Investiga-
tions of the Federal Attorney General's Office, and that he attended the defendant's
declaration proceedings because he was requested to do so by the Public Ministry. Ri-
cardo Hernndez L6pez et. al Case, Criminal File No. 16/95, Veracruz.
247. Interview with Digna Ochoa, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 3,
2000).
248. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 16.
249. See supra Part III. A.
250. Basic Principles on Lawyers, supra note 170, art. 6
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equality of arms" between the defense and the prosecution.25 1
In the Mexican criminal justice system, however, the defense is
neither equal nor separate. In this situation, the rights of the
accused are further eroded.
2. Persons of Confidence
The Mexican Constitution also provides the accused with
the right to have the assistance of a "person of confidence.
252
In addition, the Federal Law to Prevent Torture states that the
accused may be represented by an attorney or a person of confi-
dence when making a formal declaration before the Public Min-
istry.253 The right to select a person of confidence augments an
individual's options for legal representation. It can, theoreti-
cally, even make up for the deficiencies of the public defender
system by allowing a person to choose a representative whom he
or she trusts, and who, though lacking formal legal training, may
nonetheless operate as an effective advocate.
In practice, however, the person of confidence can make
matters worse. In some cases, for example, the person of confi-
dence assigned to the defendant was in fact unknown to the de-
fendant.2 54 In a number of other cases that our delegation en-
countered, the person of confidence actually worked for the
Public Ministry.255 As Digna Ochoa, a leading defense lawyer
states, "in many cases, the person of confidence may be from the
Public Ministry, trusted by the Public Ministry, in the confidence
of the Public Ministry. "256 She cited one instance, among others,
in which a cleaning person for the Public Ministry was assigned
251. Little v.Jamaica, Hum. Rts. Comm. Decisions, 43rd Sess., para. 8.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/
html/dec283.htm.
252. MEX. CONST. art. 20(IX).
253. See Federal Law to Prevent Torture art. 9. Under these provisions, however, it
is not apparent whether the representation requirement applies during the prior inves-
tigation stage or only during the period following the formal declaration before a
judge. Id.
254. See, e.g., Fernando Dominguez Paredes et. al Case, Criminal File No. 30/95,
Mexico City. In this case, the defendants testified that they neither knew nor had any
contact with the persons of confidence before or during their declarations. Id.
255. See also Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure,
supra note 39, at 18.
256. Interview with Digna Ochoa, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (May
29, 2000).
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as the person of confidence for the defendant.257 In another
case, an individual who had signed as the person of confidence
was allegedly one of the people who had tortured the defen-
dant.258 The precise extent of this problem is unclear, though
the ability of one defense lawyer to recount several specific inci-
dents is troubling. At least as far as that attorney is concerned,
the practice is sufficiently widespread to justify the conclusion
that "[persons of confidence] do not have any function. The
only thing they do is to legitimize something that is illegal."
25 9
In certain instances, interference comes not from the prose-
cutor but from the public defender. According to one person
who herself has acted as a legal representative, public defenders
often discourage individuals from appointing a person of confi-
dence because they prefer not to work with one.260 Nor, in prac-
tice, does the defendant have the option to replace an inade-
quate public defender with the person of confidence. One rea-
son is that persons of confidence are regularly denied the power
to sign documents during court proceedings. 261 Another is that
they are further denied the right to ask direct questions during
court proceedings, but must instead do so through the public
defender.2
6 2
E. Conclusions and Recommendations
The Mexican criminal justice system routinely denies access
to counsel until the accused make a formal declaration before
the Public Ministry. Even during this important proceeding, the
accused is not permitted to communicate with his or her legal
representative. Legal representatives, moreover, often appear
late or fail to attend at all. These practices effectively deny the
257. Id.
258. Id.; see also Fernando Dominguez Paredes Case. The persons of confidence in
this case were affiliated with the Public Ministry. One representative was working as a
legal secretary to the Public Ministry when the defendants gave their declarations; the
other person of confidence was promoted to the position of legal secretary for the
Public Ministry of Ixtlahuaca. Id.
259. See Interview with Digna Ochoa, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex.
(June 3, 2000).
260. Interview with Ana Lorena Delgadillo, law student and person of confidence,
in Mexico City, Mex. (May 30, 2000) (stating that "[i]t's hard to work with a public
defender because they don't want [the person of confidence] to be their boss").
261. Id. This is in practice, but not necessarily the law. Id.
262. Id.
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accused legal advice during the period of initial investigation
during which they need it most. Even without these problems,
the quality of legal defense in Mexico is generally poor, espe-
cially to those who cannot afford private attorneys. Moreover,
the right to representation by a "person of confidence," a device
meant to address the lack of public defenders, is often perverted
to assign the accused with individuals who are agents of the pros-
ecution.
The delegation recommends that:
* Mexico's laws should provide defendants with access to
counsel at the moment of detention, not upon making a
declaration. The Constitution should also be made clear
on the issue of access to counsel, and should conform to
the international human rights standards. In addition,
the criminal procedure codes should be revised to pro-
vide the accused with the right to an attorney from the
beginning of the criminal process.
" Efforts should be made to educate law enforcement per-
sonnel, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys of the
constitutional provisions that allow the defendants to
have immediate access to attorneys. As Dr. Csar Es-
quincia noted, the 1993 modification of the Constitution,
which in his view provides the defendants with early ac-
cess to counsel, has not "been easy to advance because of
decades of custom. '265 Thus, education and training of
those involved in the criminal justice system would be cru-
cial in promoting measures of reform.
* State-level public defenders should have additional re-
sources through the establishment of a public defender
institute, modeled after the Federal Defender Institute of
Mexico. The institute, which would be in charge of the
public defender system at the state level, would work to-
wards increasing the salaries of the public defenders, as
well as to furnish them with the resources and the support
necessary to provide adequate representation for the de-
fendants. Such an institute would attempt to alleviate the
current "inequality of arms" that exists between the de-
fense and the prosecution.
263. Interview with C~sar Esquinca Mufioz, Director General, Federal Public De-
fender's Institute, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 6, 2000).
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* A further suggestion for reform, as indicated by several
academics and lawyers in Mexico, is to place the defend-
ants at the disposition of the judge as early as possible.264
Some have stated that because of the poor quality of pub-
lic defense, having immediate access to counsel merely
"adds to the bureaucracy without providing any addi-
tional protection to the defendants." 26 5 For example,
since the presence of an attorney during the declaration
only serves to legitimize the judicial process that under-
mines the rights of the defendant, the accused should in-
stead have prompt access to the judge.2 66 In this manner,
the defendant would not be placed in the hands of the
Judicial Police and the Public Ministry without any form
of accountability, but before a judge.
IV. PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
A. Introduction
As the previous section suggests, the defense of fundamen-
tal rights in Mexico by default often falls to independent defense
lawyers and other human rights advocates. Too many of these
lawyers, however, have been the target of harassment and intimi-
dation from official and unofficial sources. The intimidation of
Mexican human rights defenders has been underlined as a cause
of concern by several international bodies, including the Inter-
American Commission, the United Nations Rapporteur on Ex-
ecutions, 267 and the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Pro-
motion and Protection of Human Rights. In the overwhelming
majority of these cases, the Mexican government has failed to
adequately investigate and prosecute those responsible for the
persecution of human rights defenders.
264. Interview with Mariclaire Acosta Urquidi, Director, Mexican Human Rights
Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 1, 2000).
265. Id.
266. Interview with Miguel Sarre, Professor of Law, Autonomous Technical Insti-
tute of Mexico, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
267. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extra-
judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Dot. E/
CN.4/2000/3/Add.3. para. 103 (2000) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report].
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B. Mexico's Obligations to Protect Human Rights Defenders
1. International Obligations
International law affords lawyers and other human rights
defenders in Mexico both general and specific safeguards. Com-
prehensive treaties, such as the ICCPR and the American Con-
vention, guarantee basic rights that are central to the work the
human rights advocates pursue, including freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. More
specific instruments, such as the Basic Principles on Lawyers and
the recently approved Declaration on the Right and Responsibil-
ity of Human Rights Defenders ("Defenders Declaration")268
provide more extensive safeguards.
As the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has observed,
neither legal defense nor human rights advocacy could proceed
without the ability to think and speak freely, to join with others,
or to peaceably assemble.269 Mexico is bound to observe these
rights under the general human rights treaties that it has rati-
fied. In particular, the American Convention guarantees free-
dom of expression (Article 13),270 the right to assembly (Article
268. Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Or-
gans of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 144, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144 (1999) [here-
inafter Defenders Declaration], available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/
53/a53r144.pdf.
269. See LAwvRs COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A DISABLING ENVIRONMENT" GOVERN-
MENTAL RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs IN MEXICO 6 (1999) [here-
inafter, A DISABLING ENVIRONMENT].
270. American Convention art. 13. Article 13 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right
includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form
of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not
be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition
of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent neces-
sary to ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or
morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or
means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint,
radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of
information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication
and circulation of ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertain-
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15),271 and freedom of association (Article 16)272 Likewise, the
ICCPR protects substantially the same rights in Articles 19 (ex-
pression) ,273 Article 21 (the assembly) 274 and Article 22 (associa-
ments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of
regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and ado-
lescence.
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar
action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including
those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be consid-
ered as offenses punishable by law.
Id.
271. American Convention art. 15. Article 15 states:
The right of peaceful assembly, without arms, is recognized. No restrictions
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in con-
formity with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interest of
national security, public safety or public order, or to protect public health or
morals or the rights or freedom of others.
Id.
272. American Convention art. 16. Article 16 states:
1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political,
economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes.
2. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to such restrictions estab-
lished by law as may be necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of
national security, public safety or public order, or to protect public health
or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.
3. The provisions of this article do not bar the imposition of legal restrictions,
including even deprivation of the exercise of the right of association, on
members of the armed forces and the police.
Id.
273. ICCPR art. 19. Article 19 states:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall in-
clude freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and
are necessary:
a. For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
b. For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public),
or of public health or morals.
Id.
274. ICCPR art. 21. Article 21 states:
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be
placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity
with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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tion).275 As with many human rights instruments, these treaties
permit restrictions on these fundamental freedoms only when
necessary to ensure certain specified purposes, such as "national
security," and then only "by law."27 6 Nor did any official with
whom the delegation met suggest that such provisions legiti-
mated intimidation of defense lawyers or human rights advo-
cates. To the contrary, the American Convention and the
ICCPR each make clear that governments not only must refrain
from infringing on basic rights, but that they must take affirma-
tive steps to secure them, including providing remedies where
violations occur.2 7 7 In these ways, these treaties and conventions
"add to the legal foundation that requires respect for the rights
of associations, including, human rights NGOs.
278
In addition, the Basic Principles on Lawyers, 279 further spec-
ify protections that address the unique role defense attorneys
have in safeguarding fundamental rights. Basic Principle Num-
ber 16, for example, states that "[g] overnments shall ensure that
Id.
275. ICCPR art. 22. Article 22 states:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, includ-
ing the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his inter-
ests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those
which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre
public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition
of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in
their exercise of this right.
Id.
276. See, e.g., American Convention art. 13(2). Cf LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS/CROWLEY PROGRAM IN INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS, OBSTACLES TO REFORM: EXCEP-
TIONAL COURTS, POLICE IMPUNITY AND PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN
TURKEY 108-10 (1999) [hereinafter LCHR/CROWLEY TURKEY REPORT].
277. American Convention art. 1 (stating that "[t]he States Parties to this Conven-
tion undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to
all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and
freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other
social condition"); art 10 (providing that "[elvery person has the right to be compen-
sated in accordance with the law in the event he has been sentenced by a final judg-
ment through a miscarriage ofjustice"); ICCPR art. 2 (stating that "[e]ach State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or free-
doms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy").
278. A DISABLING ENviRONMENT, supra note 269, at 3.
279. See infra notes 181-86, 220-24, 249-50 and accompanying text.
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lawyers are able to perform all their professional functions with-
out intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper interfer-
ence; and shall not suffer, or be threatened with, prosecution or
administrative, economic or other sanctions for any action taken
in accordance with recognized professional duties, standards
and ethics. '28" Basic Principle Number 17 provides that
"[w] here the security of lawyers is threatened as a result of dis-
charging their functions, they shall be adequately safeguarded
by the authorities."281
Human rights defenders enjoy additional protection from
the Defenders Declaration. Approved by the General Assembly
in 1998, the Defenders Declaration extends and clarifies more
general freedoms as they apply to human rights advocates. As
with the Basic Principles on Lawyers, the Defenders Declaration
does not constitute a binding treaty, but does serve both as an
authoritative interpretation of how other human rights instru-
ments pertain to human rights defense and as evidence of devel-
oping customary international law.282 Mexico, moreover, "ex-
pressed its full agreement when the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights finally adopted the [Defenders] Declaration
in April 1998. "1283 For all of these reasons, the Declaration is a
significant "aid in interpreting the Mexican State's existing obli-
gations under international human rights law."
284
Article 1 of the Defenders Declaration provides that
"[e]veryone has the right, individually and in association with
others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realiza-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national
and international levels. 285 Further, the Declaration "identifies
and protects those activities that are most important to the work
of human rights defenders worldwide. '286 Among these include
such basic freedoms as the right to assembly,287 to- "know, seek,
obtain, receive . . . [and] publish information about human
rights, 2 8 to participate in government and public affairs,289 to
280. Basic Principles on Lawyers, supra note 170, art. 16.
281. Id. art. 17.
282. A DISABLING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 269, at 4.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Defenders Declaration art. 1.
286. A DISABLING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 269, at 5.
287. Defenders Declaration art. 5.
288. Id. art. 6.
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file complaints of rights violations and receive an effective rem-
edy,290 and to 'solicit, receive and utilize resources' related to the
protection and promotion of human rights. '291 Recently, the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights announced that
it planned to name a special rapporteur to monitor the treat-
ment of human rights defenders around the world.292 This deci-
sion confirms the world community's determination that all gov-
ernments respect the principles that the Defenders Declaration
sets forth.
2. Domestic Obligations
Domestic law in Mexico also affords further, though more
limited, protection of human rights defenders. In particular, the
Mexican Constitution, while not specifically addressing freedoms
for human rights advocates, nonetheless sets forth fundamental
guarantees that are central both to their work and the work of
their organizations.
Together, Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution safeguard
freedom of expression. Article 6 provides that the "expression
of ideas shall not be subject to any judicial or administrative in-
vestigation, unless it offends good morals, infringes the rights of
others, incites to crime, or disturbs the public order. 293 Simi-
larly, Article 7 more specifically protects written advocacy, stating
"[flreedom of writing and publishing writings is inviolable. No
law or authority may establish censorship, require bonds from
authors or printers, or restrict the freedom of printing" subject
only to limitations "by the respect due to private life, morals, and
public peace. "294
Freedom of assembly and association, rights that are espe-
cially critical for human rights organizations, receive constitu-
tional protection in Article 9. This provision states that the
289. Id. art. 8.
290. Id. art. 9.
291. Id. art. 13.
292. See Press Release HR/CN/982, United Nations Comm'n on Human Rights,
Commission on Human Rights Concludes Fifty-Sixth Session (Apr. 28, 2000), available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/viewOl/5CDA1D740E03FO1E 8 02568
D2002B168D?opendocument; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, UN to Monitor
Harassment of Rights Workers (Apr. 27, 2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/
2000/04/unO427.htm.
293. MEX. CONST. art. 6.
294. Id. art. 7.
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"right to assemble of associate peacefully for any lawful purpose
cannot be restricted. ' 295 The Article does, however, set out two
limitations. The rights mentioned do not extend to "delibera-
tive armed assemblies. '296 In addition, "only citizens of the Re-
public may" exercise the rights of assembly and association, and
then only "to take part in the political affairs of the country. 29 7
Despite these protections, the Mexican government has em-
ployed, or sought to employ, various legal mechanisms to restrict
human rights advocacy. Certain laws or proposed legislation at
both the federal and state levels provides for strict government
scrutiny of human rights NGOs in particular. Specific devices
include, among others: oppressive, mandatory registration re-
quirements, extensive oversight by government bodies, or the
conditioning of government benefits on submission to such re-
gistration and oversight.2 98
Of special concern is the Mexican government's power to
place "serious limitations on the ability of Mexican human rights
NGOs to interact with human rights organizations from other
parts of the world."299 This power stems in significant part from
Article 33 of the Constitution, which in part states that
"[f] oreigners may not in any way participate in the political af-
fairs of the country."30 ' The same Article further provides that
"the Federal Executive shall have the exclusive power to compel
any foreigner whose remaining he may deem inexpedient to
abandon the national territory immediately and without the ne-
cessity of previous legal action."30 1 Expulsions under Article 33
are immediate and do not require a judicial proceeding or hear-
295. Id. art. 9.
296. Id.
297. Id. Article 9 states in full:
The right to assemble or associate peaceably for any lawful purpose cannot be
restricted; but only citizens of the Republic may do so to take part in the politi-
cal affairs of the country. No armed deliberative meeting is authorized. No
meeting or assembly shall be deemed unlawful which has for its object the
petitioning of any authority or the presentation of a protest against any act;
nor may it be dissolved, unless insults be proffered against said authority or
violence is resorted to, or threats are used to intimidate or compel such au-
thority to render a favorable decision.
Id. See A DISABLING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 269, at 3.
298. Id. at 9-24.
299. Id. at 24.
300. MEX. CONsT. art. 33.
301. Id.
20011
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ing of any sort. ° 2 The vague wording and often arbitrary appli-
cation of Article 33, moreover, afford foreign human rights activ-
ists no basis for determining at what point their activities become
inexpedient. Article 33 expulsions, further, frequently ignore
due process rights guaranteed all individuals3 0 3 -including for-
eigners3-4under the Mexican Constitution.
30 5
One further way in which Mexico law works to restrict
human rights advocacy stems from the creation of a new visa cat-
egory for human rights observers from abroad. To receive such
a visa, known as an FM-3, applicants must meet several strict re-
quirements: the application must be filed thirty days prior to
arriving in Mexico; the applicant's NGO must be at least five
years old or have consultative status with ECOSOC; and the ap-
plication must include a schedule of planned activities while in
Mexico, a letter from a Mexican NGO that invited the applicant,
and a summary of the applicant's own previous human rights
experience. Even when granted, FM-3 visas are available for no
longer than ten days, and for groups no larger than ten people.
In practice, the Mexican Government has used these re-
quirements both to refuse visa applications to legitimate human
rights observers and to harass human rights advocates rightfully
in the country under FM-3 visas. In this regard, the Human
Rights Committee stated that:
[t]he Committee is concerned at the obstacles to the free
302. See A DISABLING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 269, at 32 (citing "Velasco Tovar
Luis" (5a 6poca Oct. 3, 1951)). The Lawyers Committee nonetheless cites one Mexican
case holding that:
the discretionary authority to expel foreigners under Article 33 is conditioned
by other provisions in the Constitution. For example, the courts have held
that certain basic due process provisions of the Constitution apply even when
State officials decide to expel foreigners under Article 33. . . The Mexican
courts specifically held that State agents may not act arbitrarily in deciding to
expel foreigners pursuant to Article 33 and must justify and provide the ratio-
nale for their deportation decisions in order to comply with the Mexican Con-
stitution. State agents also may not mistreat foreigners held in detention
before deportation.
Id.
303. MEX. CONST. art. 16 (outlining due process rights).
304. See id. art. 1 (extending constitutional rights to "every person in the United
Mexican States").
305. See GLOBAL EXCHANGE, FOREIGNERS OF CONSCIENCE: THE MEXICAN GOVERN-
MENT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVERS IN CHIAPAS (1999),
available at http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/mexico/observers/report (ex-
amining Mexican law regarding expulsion of foreign human rights activists).
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movement of foreigners, especially the members of non-gov-
ernmental organizations investigating human rights viola-
tions on Mexican territory, and in particular the fact that resi-
dence permits have been cancelled and visas refused for the
same reasons. The State party should lift the restrictions on
the access and activities of persons entering Mexico to investi-
gate human rights violations. °6
These restrictions, moreover, have been employed exclusively
against foreign nationals involved in human rights work. As the
Lawyers Committee recently noted, "foreign businessmen do not
face the same threat even when they travel to Mexico to lobby
the legislatures or governmental officials for favorable trade leg-
islation"3°7 or other policy reforms that arguably constitute in-
volvement in the political affairs of the country.
In December 2000, President Fox's office issued a press re-
lease announcing that foreigners wishing to visit Mexico as
human rights observers would no longer be required to obtain
special FM-3 visas, but the President did not issue instructions to
consulates and embassies regarding how to comply with this an-
nouncement.30 8 Reports that the National Migration Institute
(Instituto Nacional de Migraci6n, or the "INM") has issued a cir-
cular with new instructions facilitating the entry of foreign
human rights observers has not been confirmed.
C. Intimidation of Lawyers and Other Human Rights Advocates
A disturbing number of lawyers and activists who met with
the Crowley delegation reported incidents of harassment that
they attributed to government actors. Even in those cases where
the perpetrators remain unidentified, the government's failure
to identify those responsible raises questions of official tolera-
tion, or even complicity, in the intimidation of human rights de-
fenders. 30 9 The nature of these problems in part makes assess-
306. See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Mexico, supra note
89.
307. A DISABLING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 269, at 31.
308. SeePress Release, Office of the President, Mexico Lifts Restrictions on Foreign
Citizens (Dec. 23, 2000).
309. Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 267, para. 103. The Special Rap-
porteur Report states that:
The continuing threats against the lives of human rights defenders suggest
that the Government has not, despite its declared commitment to do so, taken
adequate steps to provide these persons with protection and eliminate threats
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ing their precise scope difficult. In general, however, our mis-
sion confirmed the conclusions of such groups as Amnesty
International that "Mexican human rights defenders face re-
peated acts of intimidation and harassment on account of their
activities to promote and protect human rights." 1 In the words
of Rosairo Huerta Lara, a professor of law who has received
death threats while working for human rights in Veracruz, in
Mexico "working for human rights is hard and dangerous." '11
Just how hard and dangerous is illustrated by the experi-
ence of the PRODH. In recent years the lawyers and staff of the
PRODH have been subject to a series of threats and physical at-
tacks in recent years, all of which remain unsolved and inade-
quately investigated by the government.
The most appalling of these incidents have been the kid-
napping and attempted murder of Digna Ochoa, the Director of
the PRODH legal division. A leading defense attorney, Ms.
Ochoa has received international recognition of her human
rights advocacy from the American Bar Association Section of
Ligitation and the Council on Cultural and Scientific Coopera-
tion in El Salvador.312 On the night of October 28, 1999, Ms.
Ochoa was attacked in her Mexico City home and, while tied up
and blindfolded, subjected to a nine-hour interrogation on
PRODH's activities. 13  Her interrogators demanded informa-
to their security. The Special Rapporteur commends the work done by NGOs,
often under difficult circumstances. She notes, however, that many of these
organizations work in situations of violence and in a polarized political atmos-
phere, in which they sometimes find it difficult to maintain an image of neu-
trality and thereby risk losing their effectiveness in building confidence
amongst estranged communities.
Id.
310. AMNESTY INT'L, MEXICO: THE SHADOW OF IMPUNITY 11 (1999). The report
further observed that "[a]lthough seldom the victims of extra-judicial executions, 'dis-
appearances' or torture, Amnesty International has received numerous reports of
human rights defenders receiving death threats, coming under armed attack and being
arbitrarily detained." Id.
311. Interview with Rosario Huerta Lara, Professor of law, Veracruz University, in
Veracruz, Mex. (May 31, 2000).
312. Chris Zombory, Heaping on the Honors: ABA Awards Recognize Contributions to
Justice System, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2000, at 100 (listing Litigation Section International
Human Rights Award); Sobre Esta Piedra, Las Adelitas, available at http://sobrees-
tapiedra.com/libros/correasagavia/007_las-adelitas.htm (describing award of CON-
CICES Roque Dalton Medal).
313. Interview with Digna Ochoa, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 6,
2000).
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tion on each PRODH staff member and other PRODH contacts,
all while transcribing her answers onto a laptop computer. 4 Af-
ter cutting her phone line, her attackers left her prone and
bound next to an open gas tank. Ms. Ochoa's kidnappers left
behind two notebooks, one inscribed ."ha, ha," and a briefcase
that had been stolen from her on August 9, when she was previ-
ously abducted.3 15 Also on October 29, the same day that Ms.
Ochoa was interrogated by intruders in her home, the PRODH
offices were broken into and ransacked. 16
The official response to Ms. Ochoa's assault remains inade-
quate, despite an order from the Inter-American Court directing
the Mexican government "to adopt, without delay, all measures
necessary" to safeguard PRODH lawyers. 317 This type of protec-
tive order, granted in "cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and
when necessary to avoid irreparable damages to persons, 318
came as a result of an application brought in the wake of Ms.
Ochoa's attack and was the first time Mexico had been brought
before the Inter-American Court.31 9 The steps taken by the Mex-
ican government to comply with the Inter-American Court, how-
ever, have not reassured the PRODH or its staff. Ms. Ochoa told
the Crowley delegation that she is "not satisfied with the protec-
tive measures implemented" on her behalf by the Mexican gov-
ernment.3 20 Though Ms. Ochoa has been assigned two police
agents from the Mexico City Attorney General's Office, the of-
ficers "lack sufficient resources, equipment and training to effec-
314. Id.; see also Press Release, PRODH, Urgent Action: Attempt on Life of Human
Rights Lawyer, Digna Ochoa Y Plbcido, Spanish version available at http://www.sj-
social.org/prodh (Oct. 29, 2000) [hereinafter Urgent Action].
315. Interview with Digna Ochoa, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 6,
2000); see also Urgent Action, supra note 314.
316. Interview with Digna Ochoa, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 6,
2000); see also Urgent Action, supra note 314; Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Up-
date-Mexico: Digna Ochoa Y Pldcido, Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Center For Human Rights
(Nov. 1999), available at http://www.lchr.org/121/ochoa199.htm (visited Feb. 14,
2001).
317. IACHR Report, supra note 21; see also Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Me-
dia Alert: Mexican Authorities Ordered to Ensure Safety of Human Rights Lawyers,
available at http://www.lchr.org/media/digna11992.htm (Nov. 23, 1999) [hereinafter
Safety of Human Rights Lawyers].
318. American Convention art. 63; see also Safety of Human Rights Lawyers, supra
note 317.
319. See id.
320. Interview with Digna Ochoa, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 6,
2000).
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tively guarantee her safety. '321 On several occasions, the police
agents' car has not functioned, and they have not been given
enough money to purchase fuel.3 2 2 Additionally, neither the
agents nor their car are equipped with a radio or cellular tele-
phone, "making it impossible for Ms. Ochoa to locate them, or
for them to call for police backup in the event of a threat or
attack. '3
23
Ms. Ochoa's kidnapping was merely the latest in a series of
threats and attacks directed against her and other lawyers at the
PRODH. The attacks began on August 9, 1999. Ms. Ochoa told
the Crowley delegation that on that day, a man approached her
on the street asking for directions, then pushed her into a car
with two other men. During the four hours she was detained,
the men punched her in the stomach and stole her briefcase,
purse, address book, voting card, business cards, and other iden-
tification. 24 As she put it, while she "would like to think it was
just a common assault, the perpetrators kept saying, 'Is it her? Is
it her?' "325
Ms. Ochoa has good reason to believe that the attacks on
her were not simple street crimes in light of repeated threats
that appear to target her and her colleagues for the work that
they do. This type of intimidation dates back at least to August
1996, when the PRODH offices received an anonymous threat
directed against Ms. Ochoa and her colleague, Pilar Noriega.326
321. PRODH, Protect the Protectors of Human Rights in Mexico, Focus: HUM. RTS. IN
MEX. (PRODH), Spring 2000, at 11.
322. Id.
323. Id. The government has also begun a 24 hour government surveillance of the
PRODH's office by stationing a judicial police car in front of the building around the
clock. Members of the PRODH have suggested that these measures have as much to do
with monitoring the PRODH's activities as with protecting its workers. Interview with
Digna Ochoa, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 6, 2000). Digna Ochoa
stated, "The police are here. Sometimes I don't know who I should be seeking protec-
tion from." Id. The police did nothing to dispel this impression when the Crowley
delegation, on one of its many visits to the PRODH, took a photograph in the general
direction of the police car on duty and the plainclothes officer in the vehicle became
belligerent and demanded that the camera be turned off.
324. Interview with Digna Ochoa, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 6,
2000); see also Urgent Action, supra note 314.
325. Id.
326. Lawyers Comm. for Hum, Rts., Pilar Noriega and Digna Ochoa, Mexico, avail-
able at http://www.lchr.org/121/ochoal.htm (Aug. 1996) [hereinafter Noriega and
Ochoa]; see interview with Digna Ochoa, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (June
6, 2000).
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Significantly, an especially alarming string of threats occurred af-
ter the August 1999 attacks. Written death threats, including
one of Ms. Ochoa's business card defaced with a black cross,
were received at the PRODH by mail on September 3, 1999.27
On September'8, 1999, four envelopes containing death threats
were discovered inside PRODH's offices; one of the threats was
addressed specifically to the PRODH legal staff.3 21 On Septem-
ber 14, PRODH's receptionist found two envelopes with death
threats inside her desk drawer.3 29 On October 5, Ms. Ochoa
found her stolen voting card at the front door of her home in
Mexico City.330 The address on the card was from a previous
residence; by placing the card at her current address, her attack-
ers were making her aware that they knew where she lived and
that her whereabouts was being tracked.3 3 ' On October 13, a
bomb threat was found inside the PRODH Legal Defense De-
partment office.3 .2 These threats culminated with the October
1999 attack on Ms. Ochoa in her home.
Threats continue, notwithstanding the Inter-American
Court order directing Mexico to protect PRODH attorneys. On
January 31, 2000, for example, anonymous death threats were
discovered in a desk drawer of the PRODH legal division.
Interviews with numerous defense lawyers and other human
rights activists suggest that the experience at the PRODH is not
exceptional. Particularly striking were the accounts of Jose Luis
Izuna Espinoza and Juan Rivero, two prominent defense attor-
neys who represent elite white collar defendants. Among other
things, these attorneys told our delegation that they are con-
vinced that government authorities staged a robbery of their per-
sonal effects to mask the theft of legal documents pertaining to
an amparo action that they had filed. They further asserted that
327. Press Release, PRODH, Threats and Attacks Against the Miguel Agustin Pro
Juarez Human Rights Center (2000) [hereinafter Threats and Attacks]; see Noriega and
Ochoa, supra note 326; interview with Digna Ochoa Y Pldcido, Attorney, PRODH, in
Mexico City, Mex. (June 6, 2000).
328. Threats and Attacks, supra note 327; see Noriega and Ochoa, supra note 326;
interview with Digna Ochoa Y Pldcido, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 6,
2000).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Threats and Attacks, supra note 327; see also Noriega and Ochoa, supra note
326; interview with Digna Ochoa Y PIfcido, Attorney, PRODH, in Mexico City, Mex.
(June 6, 2000).
332. Id.
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it is not uncommon for defense attorneys to be threatened with
tax audits, malicious prosecution, or worse for overly zealous le-
gal representation. To address these issues, Mr. Izunza in partic-
ular has felt compelled to help establish a human rights commit-
tee in the Mexico City Bar Association."'
Lawyers and activists in other areas of Mexico also report
incidents of intimidation and harassment. In Oaxaca, for exam-
ple, defense attorney Israel Ochoa has reported harassment in
which officials have used legal mechanisms to impede his work.
Mr. Ochoa represents indigenous communities and clients in
southern Mexico, including many defendants from the politi-
cally tense Loxicha region. In June 1999, an arrest warrant for
Mr. Ochoa was issued pursuant to criminal charges filed in Feb-
ruary 1997 under Article 232 of the FCCP, which prohibits spon-
soring or assisting two parties with conflicting interests in the
same activity.334 This charge ostensibly arose because one of Mr.
Ochoa's Loxicha clients had allegedly implicated another client
in a confession to the authorities. 3 5 Upon learning of the incul-
patory statement at hearing on February 11, 1997, Mr. Ochoa
immediately withdrew his representation of one of the defend-
ants. 3 6 Despite this action, the Federal Office of the Attorney
General decided to initiate the criminal proceeding that same
day.33 7 Domestic and international human rights organizations,
including the Lawyers Committee, called for the charges to be
dropped, characterizing the charges as "at best an inappropriate
over-reaction given the circumstances of the case, and at worst, a
misuse of prosecutorial power for political purposes. 338 The
charges against Mr. Ochoa were dropped in September 1999,
after a judge declared the arrest warrant and criminal investiga-
tion invalid and the Attorney General allowed the appeal period
333. Interview withJos6 Luis Izunza Espinoza, Coordinator, Mexican Criminal Bar
Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 31, 2000).
334. Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Mexico-Israel Ochoa Lara, available at
http://www.lchr.org/121/israe0799.htm (July 1999) [hereinafter Ochoa].
335. In rural Mexico, it is fairly common practice for a single attorney to represent
more than one defendant in a criminal case. Id.
336. A DISABLING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 269, at 39. Mr. Ochoa has also chal-
lenged the declarations made by these and other Loxicha defendants as having been
coerced by the judicial police and members of the public ministry. Ochoa, supra note
334.
337. A DISABLING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 269, at 39
338. Ochoa, supra note 334.
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to expire."3 9 Evelio Bautista Torres, a professor of criminal law
and former judge in Oaxaca, characterized Mr. Ochoa as a
"good defender" for his success in "discovering many violations
of the criminal procedure" in his cases, 4' but added that the
"government doesn't look on Israel favorably, [and consequently
puts] up obstacles for him to work through to do his job." 41
Other activists in Oaxaca report unofficial and more dire
intimidation. Nora Martfnez, an administrator at the Comit6 Re-
gional de Derechos Humanos [Regional Human Rights Commit-
tee] Bartolom6 Carrasco ("BARCA") in Oaxaca, told the Crow-
ley delegation that there had been threats and attempts on the
life of Romualdo Wilfrido Mayren Peldez, the former director of
BARCA, which were not subsequently investigated by the govern-
ment.342 Other human rights activists recounted incidents in
which the police followed human rights defenders in an attempt
to intimidate them.343 In similar fashion, Evincio Nicholas Mar-
tinez, the President of the Oaxaca state Human Rights Commis-
sion, told us that the Commission has "suffered" and "has been
threatened because of our work. I have denounced, for exam-
ple, those who threaten my deputies who work on these
cases." 344 Mr. Martfnez stated that though he had informed the
public ministry so that they could investigate, and also an-
nounced the threats through the press, the public ministry had
failed to identify the perpetrators.345
Intimidation of human rights defenders extends not only to
lawyers but to community organizers and activists as well.
Among the most troubling cases involves Rodolfo Montiel Flo-
339. Id.
340. Interview with Evelio Bautista Torres, criminal law professor, Autonomous
University "Benito Ju~rez" of Oaxaca, in Oaxaca, Mex. (June 2, 2000).
341. Id.
342. Interview with human rights activists, in Oaxaca, Mex. (May 31, 2000) (includ-
ing Mario Hernindez, law student, BARCA; Nora Martinez, administrator, BARCA;
Martinez, professor of criminal law, Autonomous University "Benito Judrez" of Oaxaca;
Marino Mendoza Garcfa, law student, BARCA; Alicia Mesa, Technical Secretary, Centro
de Derechos Humanos Los Prfncipes; Joan Mulharek, Maryknoll Sisters; AnastAcio Luis
Ortega, Centro de Derechos Indigenas Flor y Canto; Sofia Robles Herndndez, Servicios
del Pueblo Mixe; Abd6n Rubio Cabrera, Centro de Derechos Humanos Los Principes;
and Veronica Vasquez de la Rusa, law student, BARCA).
343. Id.
344. Interview with Evincio Nicolds Martfnez, President, Oaxaca Human Rights
Commission, in Oaxaca, Mex. (May 31, 2000).
345. Id.
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res, the noted environmental activist from Guerrero state. Mr.
Montiel was recently convicted and sentenced to prison on drug
and weapons charges, despite credible evidence that the charges
against him were false and politically motivated, and that the evi-
dence against him had been fabricated and his statements co-
erced by torture.3 4 6 Mr. Montiel was first allegedly harassed by
the government in 1998, while peacefully protesting logging op-
erations in Guerrero. After his group blocked roads to halt tim-
ber trucks' passage through his community, Mr. Montiel was de-
tained and questioned by the Mexican Army, who warned that
his family would face reprisals if he reported the incident. 347 On
May 2, 1999, Mr. Montiel was detained, and under torture,
forced to sign a statement confessing to drug and weapons
crimes. During his trial, Mr. Montiel detailed the circumstances
surrounding his illegal detention, described the torture by which
his statement was coerced, and denied the drug and weapons
charges against him. Despite a conclusion by the National
Human Rights Commission that prosecution's evidence was
fabricated and the charges unfounded, Mr. Montiel was con-
victed on August 28, 2000, and sentenced to six years and eight
months in prison.
Mr. Montiel has been named a prisoner of conscience by
Amnesty International, and in April 2000 was awarded the pres-
tigious Goldman Environmental Award, which was accepted by
his wife in ceremonies in Washington, D.C., and San Francisco.
He continues to be represented by the PRODH. When Ms.
Ochoa was kidnapped and interrogated in Mexico City on Octo-
ber 28, 1999, her captors interrogated her about Guerrero,
prompting her belief that the attack may have been related to
her work in the Montiel case.3 48
D. Conclusions and Recommendations
Independent defense lawyers and human rights advocates
in Mexico have too often been the subjects of intimidation for
the work that they do. The forms of harassment that have been
346. PRODH, Silencing Environmental Activists, supra note 64
347. Amnesty Int'l, Prisoners of Conscience: Environmentalists Rodolfo Montiel
and Teodoro Cabrera, available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/
AMR410132000 (Apr. 4, 2000).
348. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights Memorandum from Anu Menon, to
Rob Varenik (Apr. 25, 2000) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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reported cover a broad spectrum, including verbal threats, tor-
ture, kidnapping, selective prosecution, and attempted murder.
These and other forms of intimidation have occurred through-
out the country and have been directed against attorneys, those
associated with human rights NGOs, and community activists. In
many instances government officials have employed legal mecha-
nisms at their command to retaliate against human rights advo-
cates. More generally, the government at all levels has too fre-
quently failed to investigate and prosecute those who have per-
petrated intimidation. In this regard, we agree with the UN
Special Rapporteur on Executions, who concluded:
[t] he continuing threats against the lives of human rights de-
fenders suggest that the Government has not, despite its de-
clared commitment to do so, taken adequate steps to provide
there persons with protection and eliminate threats to their
security. The Special Rapporteur commends the work done
by NGOs, often under difficult circumstances.34
Accordingly, the delegation recommends that:
" The Mexican government at all levels should make good
on its previous commitments and fulfill its international
obligations by thoroughly and expeditiously investigating
and prosecuting all instances of criminal wrongdoing di-
rected at defense lawyers and other human rights advo-
cates.
* The Mexican government should take further affirmative
steps to protect lawyers and human rights advocates who
have been the subjects of threats and intimidation.
* In particular, those who kidnapped and assaulted Digna
Ochoa need to be identified and brought to justice. Fur-
ther, Ms. Ochoa and her PRODH colleagues who have
been threatened should receive adequate protection from
officers with sufficient training, equipment, and funding
to comply with the mandate of the Inter-American Court.
" More generally, the Mexican government should publicly
recognize the importance of the work of non-governmen-
tal human rights organizations, as well as counteract cam-
paigns that characterize the work of human rights advo-
cates as defenders of criminals.
349. Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 267, para. 103.
2001]
872 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:801
* No prosecutions should be brought against any lawyers or
other human rights advocates for pursuing their legiti-
mate work.
* The convictions of the environmental activists Rodolfo
Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera should be vacated. Those
responsible for torturing and obtaining confessions from
Montiel and Cabrera should be identified and brought to
justice.
* The Mexican government should clearly regulate the re-
quirements and procedures for foreigners who wish to
visit Mexico as human rights observers. Relying on circu-
lars issued by the INM is insufficient, because they can
easily be replaced by new circulars.
V. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
A. Introduction
In many legal systems a vigilant, independent judiciary
serves as a vital safeguard for preventing human rights abuses
that would otherwise occur, and for redressing them when they
do take place. This is not the case in Mexico. Instead,judges in
Mexico at most enjoy the potential to be little more than a mar-
ginal check in a system that revolves around prosecutors. Even
then, this potential frequently goes unrealized.
This section examines the challenges facing the Mexican ju-
diciary and thus the people who depend upon it. It begins with
a brief consideration of relevant international and domestic
standards. Next, this section turns to the many structural fea-
tures of the Mexican criminal justice system that all but guaran-
tee that judges will be marginal while at the same time assuring
that prosecutors remain central. Finally, this part of the report
analyzes the ways in which current procedures addressing judi-
cial selection, tenure, and oversight fail to accord judges suffi-
cient independence notwithstanding recent reforms.
B. Mexico's Relevant Obligations
1. International Obligations
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines an
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international commitment to "the rule of law."35° Both the Dec-
laration and subsequent international instruments spell out the
meaning of the phrase by guaranteeing an array of specific
rights35 as well as mandating various procedures and institu-
tions.3 52 The American Convention, for example, states that
"every person has a right to a hearing, with due guarantees and
within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and im-
partial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantia-
tion of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or
for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, la-
bor, fiscal, or any other nature."35 In similar fashion, the ICCPR
provides that in the case of a criminal charge a suspect is entitled
to "a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law." '35 4 Beyond such require-
ments, nations are free to implement the rule of law in any num-
ber of ways, as is reflected in the diversity of legal systems
throughout the world.355
Certain international standards, however, do bear more di-
rectly upon the role of the judiciary. In particular, the U.N. Ba-
sic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (the "Basic
Principles on the Judiciary")356 set forth guidelines to safeguard
the integrity and autonomy of courts throughout the world.
Like the Basic Principles on Lawyers, the Basic Principles on the
Judiciary do not constitute a treaty. Nonetheless, they have re-
ceived the approval of the General Assembly and reflect a con-
sidered global consensus that provides evidence of customary in-
ternational law.
Among other things, the Basic Principles on the Judiciary
state that "It] he independence of the judiciary shall be guaran-
teed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the laws
350. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GOAR,
3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
351. See, e.g., ICCPR art. 9 (defining right to liberty).
352. Id. art. 14 (stating that "everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing
by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law").
353. American Convention art. 8(1).
354. ICCPR art. 14.
355. See Reed Brody, Introduction: The Independence of Lauyers and Judges, A Compila-
tion of International Standards, CENTRE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF LAWYERS AND JUDGES
BULLETIN, Apr.-Oct. 1990, at 3-13.
356. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, G.A. Res. 40/32, 7th
Cong., at 59, U.N. Doc. A/CONF, 121/22/Rev. 1 (1985).
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of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other insti-
tutions to respect and observe the independence of the judici-
ary.''35 7 They further provide that the judiciary shall decide mat-
ters "without any restrictions, improper influences, induce-
ments, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect
from any quarter or for any reason."358 In addition, the Princi-
ples declare that the method for selecting judges should be free
of "improper motives '' 9 and that judges should be suspended
or removed only for actions that make them unable to discharge
their duties. 6'
2. Domestic Obligations
Among other things, Mexico has a further obligation to en-
sure the independence of its judiciary under domestic law. Arti-
cle 17 of the Mexican Constitution guarantees that everyone has
the right to the administration ofjustice by competent, indepen-
dent, and impartial courts, which should issue resolutions
promptly, completely, and impartially. This article also provides
that federal and local laws should establish the means necessary
to guarantee the independence of the courts.3 61
C. The Place of the Judiciary Within the Mexican Judicial System
Renato Sales, Chief Advisor for the Mexico City Attorney
General's Office, captured a common view in telling our delega-
tion that 'judges in Mexico are the parentheses" of a criminal
justice system dominated by the prosecution.3 61 Much of the ju-
diciary's marginal role derives from the structure of Mexico's
criminal justice system itself and from the failure of judges to
assert what powers they do have. The result is an often egre-
gious imbalance in the courtroom favoring the government, a
disparity that guarantees a systemic violation of the rights of
criminal defendants.
357. Id. art. 1.
358. Id. art. 2.
359. Id. art. 10.
360. Id. art. 18. The Defenders Declaration also addresses the role and nature of
the judiciary. In particular, Article 9(2) provides that everyone has a right to a public
review of his or her complaint by a independent, impartial, and competent judicial or
other legal authority. See Defenders Declaration, supra note 268, art. 9(2).
361. MEX. CONST. art. 17.
362. Interview with Renato Sales, Chief Advisor, Mexico City Attorney General's
Office, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
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Many of the structural features that diminish the judiciary
can be traced back to Mexico's uneasy mixing of two types of
legal systems: one accusatorial, the other inquisitorial.363 In the
inquisitorial model, a single authority effectively holds the power
to investigate, accuse, and adjudicate. In an accusatorial system,
by contrast, one element of government investigates while an-
other adjudicates, at which point the opposing sides share -an
equal opportunity to intervene. Historically, Mexico has at-
tempted to move from the inquisitorial approach to an accusato-
rial framework. According to a number of experts, however,
what has instead come about is the worst of both worlds. On one
hand, the prosecution, in effect, enjoys as much or more power
than it did under a simple inquisitorial framework. Indeed, cer-
tain reforms have resulted in the augmentation of prosecutorial
powers to the point where they currently go virtually un-
checked. 64 On the other hand, however, the executive's power
is checked by little more than the facade of the independent
adjudicatory authority contemplated by a true accusatorial sys-
tem. According to one expert, the inquisitorial model, which is
marked by its lack of an adversarial element, still dominates in
Mexican law, and the Public Ministry possesses powers beyond
those expected in an accusatorial system.365 As Sales put it,
"[o]ur system is not an accusatorial system. It's not an inquisito-
rial system. It's a mixed system. A mixed system is inquisitorial
because the real power is in the hands of the executive. '3 66 This
imbalance, he further explained, is at the root of the problems
363. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 4-5 nn.14 & 15.
364. Interview with Renato Sales, Chief Advisor, Mexico City Attorney General's
Office, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000); see also Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights,
Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra note 39, at 5-6.
365. J. Antonio Aguilar Vald~z, First Visitor, Mexico City Human Rights Commis-
sion, described how Mexico's 1917 legislation aimed for an accusatory penal process
over which the judge would preside, with the two parties sharing equal opportunity to
intervene. Aguilar Vald~z, however, further explained that the Constitution does not
provide for this kind of system, and the.initial investigation is under the control of the
Public Ministry, who "presides over everything and does whatever he wants." Interview
with J. Antonio Aguilar Vald~z, First Visitor, Mexico City Human Rights Commission, in
Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000).
366. Interview with Dr. Samuel I. Del Villar Kretchmar, Attorney General of Mex-
ico City and Renato Sales, Chief Advisor, Mexico City Attorney General's Office, in
Mexico City, Mex. (June 6, 2000).
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with Mexico's criminal justice system. 67
This mixed system encourages the police and prosecution
to set the terms in a given case while leaving judges with little
opportunity to intervene in any meaningful Way. In the words of
one law student, acting as a person of confidence during the
process, "defendants find the first judge [to be] the police,"
some of whom allegedly fabricate proof in order to detain some-
one.36 8 When the Public Ministry then receives notice of an ac-
cusation, a prosecutor immediately begins to investigate and
look for proof, with no one supervising his or her work. As a
result, a prosecutor often completes preparing a case before it is
presented to the judge. 69 One magistrate in Mexico City sug-
gested that the Public Ministry should carry out the initial inves-
tigation under the oversight of the judges, which would aid in
the efficiency of the process, and would increase confidence in
the system. In addition, this magistrate stated that "[o] ne of the
problems in Mexican criminal law is that people don't find cred-
ible the magistrates because the investigation is under the Public
Ministry's power [which] the Public Ministry is totally free to
bring without limitation." 7 °
One factor further enhancing the Public Ministry's advan-
tage is the Mexican system's heavy reliance on the written record
as opposed to hearings or other adversarial processes. Though a
common feature of civil law systems, 37t the emphasis in the con-
text of the Mexican framework means that judges are forced to
rely on a record compiled almost exclusively by the executive.
To cite one example, judges ordinarily base their decision to is-
sue an arrest warrant on what is contained in the written record,
which the prosecutor alone has prepared. 72 As if this were not
enough, in urgent and en flagrancia cases, prosecutors can en-
367. Interview with Renato Sales, Chief Advisor, Mexico City Attorney General's
Office, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
368. Interview with Ana Lorena Delgadillo, law student and person of confidence,
in Mexico City, Mex. (May 30, 2000).
369. Interview with J. Antonio Aguilar Valdfiz, First Visitor, Mexico City Human
Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000). Aguilar Vald~z notes that the
prosecutor often prepares the suspect's declaration, as well.
370. Interview with Miguel Angel Aguilar L6pez, Magistrate, 2d Unitary Tribunal
of the Federal District, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 6, 2000).
371. LCHR/CROWLEY TURKEY REPORT, supra note 276, at 27-47 (1999).
372. Interview with Roberto Diego L6pez Herndndez, state court judge, 6th State
Penal Court, in Oaxaca, Mex. (May 30, 2000).
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tirely bypass the legal requirement of obtaining a judge's ap-
proval for arrest, which effectively puts the Attorney General in
the role of, or perhaps even superior to, a judge.37 3 If a suspect
is arbitrarily detained, moreover, no "effective post-arrest mecha-
nism of judicial control" exists. 37 4 The only way a detainee may
challenge the detention is if he brings a separate action against
the police or Public Ministry. Otherwise, a judge will not review
the detention. 5
Nowhere are constraints on the judiciary more significant
than with regard to potentially unreliable evidence. As discussed
in Part 11,376 not only does the law discourage judges from ques-
tioning confessions, it actually promotes reliance on such proof.
Judges regularly use the principle of procedural immediacy to
accept statements of the suspect into evidence and as a result,
judges can reject a defendant's retraction of the statement, even
when there is evidence of coercion or torture.377 In the unlikely
event that a judge does consider whether a confession was co-
erced, the defendant still carries the burden of proving coer-
cion, which is nearly impossible. Since the relevant information
rests not with the defendant but with the agents who allegedly
engaged in the torture, it will almost necessarily remain inacces-
373. Interview with Renato Sales, Chief Advisor, Mexico City Attorney General's
Office, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
374. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 9.
375. See id.
376. See supra Part II.
377. According to a defendant in the Yanga case, "[e]ven after the [National]
Commission [of Human Rights] found that there had been torture, the judge kept to
the first Public Ministry declaration." Interview with Alvaro Castillo, defendant, in Mex-
ico City, Mex. (June 3, 2000). Defense lawyer Digna Ochoa, explained, "[t]he problem
is that once a person is torture[d] and signs a confession, the judge gives full value to
the declaration." Interview with Pilar Noriega and Digna Ochoa, defense attorneys, in
Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000). The First Visitor of the Mexico City Human Rights
Commission stated that:
Because the detainees are in the custody of the judicial police, they make the
initial decision without being able to talk to a lawyer, and are sometimes mis-
treated by the judicial police. Because they are afraid of further mistreatment,
they will give involuntary confessions and this problem is further exacerbated
by the principle of procedural immediacy, which seems to continue to be ap-
plied by judges.
Interview with J. Antonio Aguilar Valdz, First Visitor, Mexico City Human Rights Com-
mission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000).
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sible without the help of the court.3 78 Furthermore, if a coerced
confession is not the only evidence offered, there is a good
chance that the judge will not only allow it into evidence, but will
also use it in his or her decision. Appellate courts often will not
overturn decisions of lower courts when evidence of coercion
exists, because the judges indicate that there is other evidence in
the record that corroborates the confession. 9 Ironically, most
appellate courts will not overturn a proceeding based on "ac-
cepted practice in the administration of justice, '30 precisely be-
cause so many abuses are inherent within the system.
Perhaps more troubling, even where judges do have author-
ity, they frequently fail to exercise it. In particular, many judges
ignore violations of both procedural and constitutional guaran-
tees. For example, judges must validate all arrests, but they
"often fail to question suspect or patently false police versions of
how detainees came into custody."3 ' In some cases, upper level
courts have even ruled that despite a lower court's erroneous
validation of the arrest, a defendant can still be tried simply be-
cause a judge certified the indictment.38 2 In similar fashion,
courts often fail to intervene even when the suspect's defender
clearly did not adequately represent the suspect.38 3 Some de-
fenders even indicated that judges actively hinder their attempts
to provide representation. According to one, "if you're an ag-
gressive public defender, the judge complains. Thejudges don't
want to be disturbed. So the public defender does minimum
work, so the cases keep moving." 8 4 At least one prosecutor con-
firmed this general picture in stating that the judiciary contrib-
utes to a situation in which defense lawyers are like zeros and
prosecutors are like 600-pound gorillas. 8 5
Other common practices further undermine judicial over-
378. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 22.
379. See id.
380. See id. at 31.
381. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SYSTEMIC INJUSTICE, supra note 20, at 37. This occurs
particularly in cases of torture or disappearances. Id.
382. Id. at 37-38.
383. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 25.
384. Interview with Ana Lorena Delgadillo, law student and person of confidence,
in Mexico City, Mex. (May 30, 2000).
385. Interview with Renato Sales, Chief Advisor, Mexico City Attorney General's
Office, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
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sight. The Crowley delegation was particularly surprised to dis-
cover how rarely judges attend proceedings at all, but instead
rely on secretaries to go in their place. As a professor of criminal
law put it, 'judges are locked in their offices," and most "have
their secretaries or even lower employees, taking depositions
and declarations." 86 According to one defense attorney, Digna
Ochoa, "the process is all written, and the secretary of the judge
is present, but really the judge is not present. Many of the
judges don't know the lawyers, much less the person they're go-
ing to be sentencing." '387 J. Antonio Aguilar Valdez, of the
Human Rights Commission for the Mexico City, stated that
"[t] he secretaries really oversee the cases. The judges only ap-
pear on rare or important cases." ' Two prisoners, Enrique and
Adridn Aranda Ochoa, confirmed this impression, explaining
that in one and a half years, they saw the judge "one or two times
only. Instead, we saw the secretary all the time. ' 389 Another pris-
oner, Alfonso del Campo Dodd, indicated that the judge did not
even sentence him, the secretary did.39 °
Notably, judges are also rarely present when testimony is be-
ing given. A prosecutor in Veracruz explained that the declara-
tion a defendant makes before the Public Ministry has probative
value, "often there is not any judicial presence," and usually the
only figures present are the prosecutor, the typist, and the de-
clarant.3 91 Moreover, without the oversight of a judge, the ste-
nographer, who creates the record, may inaccurately record the
proceedings. Digna Ochoa indicated that "[w] e have to make
sure that the typist doesn't write down something our clients
aren't saying, that there is no intimidation going on, we have to
be taking care of the witnesses at the same time as trying to pay
386. Interview with Evelio Bautista Torres, criminal law professor, Autonomous
University "Benito Jurez" of Oaxaca, in Oaxaca, Mex. (June 2, 2000).
387. Interview with Pilar Noriega and Digna Ochoa, defense attorneys, in Mexico
City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
388. Interview with J. Antonio Aguilar Vald~z, First Visitor, Mexico City Human
Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000).
389. Interview with Enrique and Adridn Aranda Ochoa, defendants, North Prison,
in Mexico City, Mex. (June 2, 2000).
390. See Interview with Alfonso del Campo Dodd, defendant, Pachuca Prison, in
Hidalgo, Mex. (June 3, 2000).
391. Interview with Rafael Hern~lndez Virues, Asst. Attorney General, Veracruz
State Attorney General's Office, in Veracruz, Mex. (June 1, 2000).
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attention to what the typist is writing down. 3 9 2 Instead of re-
cording the precise words of the declarant, the typist often will
take down the words in 'judicial language" 393-that is, legal
jargon that may reflect the stenographer's impressions and
prejudices rather than what the speaker actually said.
Several factors contribute to judicial absenteeism. Procedu-
ral codes do not clearly mandate that a judge be physically pre-
sent at given proceedings. Excessive caseloads make it impossi-
ble for mostjudges to attend all hearings in any case.3 94 In addi-
tion, the heavy reliance on the written record that is
characteristic of civil law systems adds inefficiency to the process,
exacerbating the heavy caseload problem. 95 Reliance on the re-
cord, moreover, furnishes judges with a further excuse not to be
present because what matters is the record itself, rather than the
manner in which it is compiled. In consequence, even those
judges who would take an active role in proceedings still direct a
secretary to preside over certain proceedings. A federal court
judge in Oaxaca, for example, believed that judges were free "to
request testimony, to interrogate, to take depositions, to make
conclusions."' 96 This judge expressly stated, however, that "[I]f
it is a common charge, and all the evidence is in the case file,
including the defendant's own admission, then it may be justifia-
ble that the judge not be present at a proceeding."39 7
Beyond this, the written record further works to undermine
judicial oversight even when judges do attend proceedings. This
follows because some judges apparently believe that they should
not intervene precisely because they should depend solely on
the record itself. In the words of the President of the Judicial
Council for Mexico City, "[t]he judge may believe that the per-
392. Interview with Pilar Noriega and Digna Ochoa, defense attorneys, in Mexico
City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
393. Id.
394. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 29 (describing the lack of clarity in the criminal procedure codes). A
spokesman from the Mexico City Human Rights Commission called these hearings
"long" and "laborious." Interview with J. Antonio Aguilar Valdez, First Visitor, Mexico
City Human Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000).
395. See Pilar Domingo, Rule of Law, Citizenship and Access to Justice in Mexico, Mexi-
can Studies, The Regents of the University of California (1999), available at 1999 WL
19605295.
396. Interview with Amado Chifias Fuentes, Judge, 4th District Court, in Oaxaca,
Mex. Uune 2, 2000).
397. Id.
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son is innocent but he must rely on documentation.""' A state
judge in Oaxaca amplified the point, stating: "[o]ur judicial
process is eminently written, in the written form. Therefore,
what we base our sentence on is what is included in the written
record .... It's not our custom to be in the oral form of justice
.... The idea of [a] hearing is that it is basically a formality
"399
This judge further opined that doing no more than merely
asking for a reconstruction of the events of the case would in-
trude upon the defense attorney's job and destroy the judge's
impartiality.400 In light of such attitudes, even a judge's physical
attendance does not by itself ensure meaningful judicial over-
sight.
The comparative weakness of the judiciary in the criminal
justice system reflects the position of the courts in Mexico more
generally. Of the three government branches, the judiciary is
clearly the weakest.40 1 As an initial matter, judicial review is se-
verely constrained even after recent reforms. Under these
changes, eight ministers of the Supreme Court may declare laws
unconstitutional and take them off of the books entirely.40 2
Triggering this mechanism, however, is another matter. To do
so requires a request from either one-third of Congress, one-
third of a state congress, or the Attorney General must request
the review within thirty days of the passage of the law. With
these severe restrictions, laws will rarely be challenged because
thirty days is hardly enough time to formulate a persuasive argu-
ment. The Attorney General, as part of the executive branch, is
unlikely to mount a challenge, nor is one-third of a legislative
body ordinarily likely to do So. 403 Jurisdictional limitations,
moreover, further limit the potential of judicial review. This ap-
plies in particular to Mexico's many specialized administrative
398. Interview with Dr. Juan Luis Gonzdlez, President, Judicial Council of the Fed-
eral District, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 6, 2000).
399. Interview with Roberto Diego L6pez Herndndez, state court judge, 6th State
Penal Court, in Oaxaca, Mex. (May 30, 2000).
400. Id.
401. Michael C. Taylor, Why No Rule of Law in Mexico? Explaining the Weakness of
Mexico's Judicial Branch, 27 N.M.L. REv. 141, 142 (1997).
402. Yamfn & Garcia, supra note 124, at 502 (1999). This stands in contrast to the
amparo mechanism, through which people are merely exempt from unconstitutional
laws.
403. Id. at 502.
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tribunals, which to a significant extent function beyond the
scope of judicial oversight.4 °4 For these and other reasons, the
judicial branch in Mexico remains subordinate to the legislature
and the executive both substantively and symbolically. This con-
tinuing subordination cannot help but confirm the attitude evi-
dent among criminal court judges that they should serve as mere
rubber stamps to the actions of the other branches.
D. Judicial Independence
Beyond marginalization, one further structural reason for
the ineffectiveness of the Mexican judiciary is lack of indepen-
dence. Despite recent constitutional reforms under the Zedillo
administration, many commentators both outside and inside the
Mexican criminal justice system suggest that the government still
falls short of its obligations to ensure judicial autonomy. Under
the Zedillo reforms, the Supreme Court's eleven ministers are
now elected by a two-thirds vote, rather than by a simple major-
ity, of the Senate from a list of candidates proposed by the exec-
utive.40 5 The ministers also have fixed, non-renewable terms of
fifteen years, which may foster greater independence from the
executive because a minister could survive two presidential
terms.40 6 The reforms, moreover, created the Federal Judicial
Council, to which seven members are appointed by the judiciary,
the executive, and Congress. The President of the Supreme
Court heads the Council, which was formed to relieve the Su-
preme Court of some of its administrative duties, including the
appointment of judges to lower courts, controlling disciplinary
actions againstjudges, and resolving complaints against them.40 7
404. See Domingo, supra note 395. On the federal level, the judiciary is comprised
of the Supreme Court of Justice, collegial or unitary circuit courts, district courts, and
the Council of the Federal Judiciary. Members of the Supreme Court are called minis-
ters, magistrates sit on the circuit court, and judges sit in the district court. See West-
Group Mexican Law Library, Introduction: Selected Aspects of the Mexican Legal System 14,
available at 1997 WL 685237. State courts are modeled after the structure of the federal
courts. The Superior Court of Justice is the high appellate court, and there are civil
courts and criminal courts, justices of the peace, and several specialized courts. The
specialized courts include administrative courts, family courts, real property leasing
courts, and commercial courts. See id. at 16.
405. See Domingo, supra note 395.
406. See Hbctor Fix-Fierro, Judicial Reform and the Supreme Court of Mexico: The Tra-
jectory of Three Years, 6 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 1, 6 (1998).
407. See Domingo, supra note 395. The Council was formed in 1994 at the federal
level, and some states in Mexico have introduced such councils by amending their local
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The implementation and scope of the reforms, however,
may be more apparent than real. When Zedillo took office and
introduced the reforms in 1994, he promptly replaced all of the
members of the Supreme Court with his own candidates, an act
that was reminiscent of past executive control over the judicial
branch.4 °8 Moreover, if the Senate rejects a President's candi-
date to the Supreme Court two times successively, the President
may still appoint a minister to the Court.409 As stated by the In-
ter-American Commission, "the system under which the Presi-
dent nominates candidates for confirmation by the Senate does
not appear to be conducive to the proper functioning of an
open, competitive system with due checks and balances on the
selection process."4 10
Similar concerns apply to the selection of judges on lower
courts. Although the judicial councils in Mexico City and other
federal jurisdictions oversee the appointment of trial-level and
some appellate judges through a more competitive process, the
magistrates at the highest level courts in these jurisdictions are
still appointed through a process that is heavily influenced by
the executive branch. The President of the judicial council in
Mexico City stated:
[i] t's hard to separate judicial power from political process.
The naming of the judges [is] done by the local executive.
Then it has to be approved by the local assembly so it's a po-
litical process. If the executive names a person who isn't in
the same party, the assembly won't approve the nomination.
The naming ofjudge is political. Judicial resolutions have po-
litical consequences. Our independence can only be won
every day with our work and being transparent and far away
from politics. As an institution, it shouldn't be political. At
least in the naming of judges, there's no independence be-
cause it's a political process.41'
Moreover, "many lower level judges named previously through a
process which was political in nature, remain in their positions
statutes. See Jorge A. Vargas, The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico: An Appraisal of
President Zedillos Judicial Reform of 1995, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L & POLY 195, 334 (1996).
408. See Taylor, supra note 401, at 158.
409. See Yamfn & Garcia, supra note 124, at 502.
410. IACHR Report, supra note 21, para. 41.
411. Interview with Dr. Juan Luis Gonzdlez, President, Judicial Council of the Fed-
eral District, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 6, 2000).
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... [and] often have strong ties to the executive branch. 412
Several organizations also remain skeptical of the Council's
ability to handle complaints. When, for example, the PRODH
filed an administrative complaint against a judge who did not
respond after 35 days to an amparo suit filed by four indigenous
people who had been arbitrarily detained, the Council rejected
the complaint months later, "alluding to [the judge's] excessive
workload. '413 According to the Lawyers Committee, "the judicial
councils [at the Mexico City and federal levels] often state that
they have no competence to review the actions of judges in rela-
tion to situations of possible abuses of the rights of defend-
ants. '4 14 Furthermore, the councils themselves suffer from a
lack of independence, because they maintain close ties to the
judiciary that they are charged with disciplining and supervis-
ing.415
The Inter-American Commission has also noted thatjudicial
independence further suffers from lack of adequate tenure.
Currently, only the fifteen-year terms for Supreme Court provide
meaningful tenure. By contrast, circuit court magistrates and
district court judges have only six-year terms, after which they
may be ratified, promoted, or removed.41 6 In the view of the
Inter-American Commission:
[t]he fact that circuit magistrates and district judges are sub-
ject to transfer until appointed to a new position undermines
the principle of genuine removability, which is an essential
requirement for an independent judicial branch. Moreover,
the fact that lower court judges are not unremovable at all,
together with the absence of anything that could be called a
genuine legal career, gives cause for real concern.4 17
As a result, those judges who hope to be appointed to another
position may be inclined to serve governmental interests.41 8
By definition, lack of independence exposes the judiciary to
412. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 26.
413. PRODH, Briefing Materials for Members of Congress and State Department 4
(2000).
414. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 27.
415. See id. at 28.
416. See id. at 26.
417. IACHR Report, supra note 21, para. 394.
418. Id. para. 395.
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pressure from the Public Ministry to obtain convictions rather
than acquittals, even if the decisions are based on unreliable
confessions or other weak evidence.419 A number of actors in
the criminal justice system told the Crowley delegation of their
impression that judges, and the court generally, are allied with
the prosecution, and the problem of improper influence is gen-
erally perceived to be worse at the state level than at the federal
level.4 20 As one defense lawyer in Mexico City put it, "it seems
very important to me that the judge . . .sees himself as an ally
with, the Public Ministry... [s] o that the problem of the lawyers
is not only to confront the Public Ministry but also the personnel
of the judge, the court. '421 From a more technical angle, a pros-
ecutor in the Mexico City Attorney General's office stated that
the power to grant provisional liberty to a defendant under Arti-
cle 21 of the Mexican Constitution is seen as a power of the At-
torney General rather than as a right of the defendant, and "in
practice, the judge usually grants or denies provisional liberty
based on the attorney general's recommendation, and thus
treats it as being at the discretion of the prosecutor."4 22 In Mex-
ico City, judges "who are absolutely under the hand of the Public
Ministry's office" are called 'judges of consignment," as if they
were on consignment for the executive. 423
Experts with whom we met told us that an even more
pointed source of pressure is the threat of prosecution. Only the
Public Ministry may conduct criminal investigations, including
proceedings against judges, and some judges indicated that em-
ployees of the Public Ministry threaten criminal proceedings for
419. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 26-27.
420. See IACHR Report, supra note 21, para. 393; see also U.S. State Dep't Report, supra
note 21, at 834-35. One defense attorney indicated that although judges' salaries have
recently been raised, the judges on the state level are still underpaid compared to those
at the federal level "so their independence is worse." Interview with Pilar Noriega, de-
fense attorney, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 30, 2000).
421. Interview with Pilar Noriega and Digna Ochoa, defense attorneys, in Mexico
City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
422. Interview with Renato Sales, Chief Advisor, Mexico City Attorney General's
Office, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 29, 2000).
423. Interview with Dr. Luis de la Barreda Solorzano, President, Mexico City
Human Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 31, 2000); see also Interview with
Mariclaire Acosta, Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human
Rights, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 1, 2000) (stating that the prosecutor generally "be-
comes" the judge, and there is "no real independence between the executive and the
judge").
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a failure to convict. With no external control of the Public Min-
istry's authority, agents can effectively control the judiciary
through these threats of prosecution.4 24 According to the Presi-
dent of the Mexico City Human Rights Commission, " [w] e're liv-
ing in a situation which I have never seen in all my years in the
law, where judges and magistrates are being investigated because
they have not done what the Public Ministry's office wanted
them to .... A week ago this office submitted recommenda-
tion [s] to end investigations against three judges."42 5 A public
defender in Veracruz echoed the point, remarking that 'judges
either obey or agree with the prosecution, maybe because they
fear them. '4 26 This attorney also explained that public defend-
ers try to use the law to argue against prosecutors, but they often
need the judge to support them, which is very uncommon, be-
cause "U]udges who weigh the prosecutor's evidence critically,
standing up to the Public Ministry, can get into trouble."4 27
Perhaps the most grave form of pressure arises not from the
executive's own threats against judges but its failure to protect
them from external danger. This problem has been sufficiently
pressing to draw the attention of the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, who
expressed concern to the Mexican government on at least two
occasions when judges who did not imprison suspects were both
removed from office and received death threats.4 28 One of these
judges was later murdered, and the Special Rapporteur indi-
cated that his death "put at grave risk the independence and
424. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Elements of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 39, at 27.
425. Interview with Dr. Luis de La Barreda Solorzano, President, Mexico City
Human Rights Commission, in Mexico City, Mex. (May 31, 2000); see also Interview with
J. Antonio Aguilar Valdez, First Visitor, Mexico City Human Rights Commission, in
Mexico City, Mex. (June 5, 2000). (stating that the Public Ministry can initiate an investi-
gation against judges who do not do what they wish).
426. Interview with Roberto Camacho Hernindez, public defender, in Veracruz,
Mex. (June 1, 2000).
427. Id.
428. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence ofJudges and Lawyers, Mr.
Param Cumaraswamy, U.N. ESC, Comm. on HR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/39
(Feb. 12, 1998), available at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/documentation/com-
mission/e-cn4-1998-39.htm; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur, 52nd Sess., E/CN.4/
1996/37 (Mar. 1, 1996), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/un/chr/chr96/
thematic/37-law.htm.
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impartiality of the judiciary in Mexico." '429
Against these odds, some judges have ultimately issued posi-
tive rulings on the basis of human rights considerations. Many
of these decisions, however, underscore the importance of
outside pressure. To cite one example, in Israel Ochoa's case,
who was arrested for supposedly representing two clients with
opposing interests, the judge deciding the amparo action ulti-
mately annulled the arrest warrant, holding that the prosecution
had not sufficiently established the elements of the crime. This
occurred only after the case received significant reaction from
national and international human rights organizations, the Oax-
acan bar association, and other groups. As Human Rights Watch
stated, " [w] hile positive, these cases also highlighted a disturbing
weakness in Mexico's justice system: years of injustice could be
ignored by judges, and the ability to obtain justice depended not
on ingrained respect for human rights within the justice system
but on a victim's ability to marshal public support for his or her
case.43°
E. Conclusions and Recommendations
As parentheses in the criminal justice system, the judiciary
in Mexico too often fails to serve as a meaningful guarantor of
basic rights. To a significant extent, this situation results from
important structural features of Mexico's mixed accusatorial and
inquisitorial system. In particular, responsibility for the initial,
and usually most important, phase of investigation lies with the
Public Ministry, which compiles the written record that frames
the rest of the criminal process. In consequence, many judges
not only fail to question, but also rely upon questionable evi-
dence, such as coerced confessions. Even where judges do have
authority, moreover, they frequently fail to exercise it. Especially
troubling in this regard is judicial absenteeism, itself a result of
overly heavy caseloads, unclear procedural codes, and the sys-
tem's heavy reliance on the written record. In addition to these
problems, judicial independence presents another concern. In
general, the executive and legislative branches wield considera-
429. Report of the Special Rapporteur, 52nd Sess., E/CN.4/1996/37 (Mar. 1, 1996),
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/un/chr/chr96/thematic/37-4aw.htm.
430. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000: MEXICO HUMAN RIGHTS DEVEL-
OPMENTS 137, 140 (1999).
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ble power in judicial selection, oversight, and-given lack of suf-
ficient tenure-reappointment. Executive threat of prosecu-
tion, along with failure to protect judges from outside threats,
constitute still further factors undermining vigorous judicial en-
forcement of fundamental rights.
The delegation recommends that:
" Mexico should revise its constitution to move from an
inquisitorial system to an accusatorial system, by taking
away some of the powers of the Public Ministry and
giving them to the judge.
" Judges should actively engage in the criminal justice
process, and all criminal procedure codes should be
carefully drafted to clarify when judges must be pre-
sent at criminal proceedings. No testimony should be
taken without the presence of the judge, and no sen-
tence should be given by anyone but the judge.
* The Mexican government should consider modifying
the criminal justice system in ways that will decrease
the emphasis on a written record, which would in-
crease the efficiency and transparency of proceedings.
" All hearings should be open to the public, except for
cases exempted by international instruments.
" The Mexican government should take greater steps to
ensure the independence of the judiciary, as man-
dated under domestic and international law, by de-
creasing executive influence over the selection
processes for judges. The government should also
seek to guarantee the independence of the Judicial
Council from the Supreme Court.
" The selection process of judges should continue to be
evaluated, and programs on both the state and federal
levels should be instituted to ensure that the high qual-
ity, independent lawyers are entering the judiciary. In
addition, judges' salaries should be evaluated and
raised accordingly.
